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Ideas of Thomas Mautner, by Text
[Australian, fl. 1996, Lecturer at Australian National University.]
1996
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Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy
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'definition'
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p.126
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9959
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'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept
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'definition'
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p.126
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9961
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'Contextual definitions' replace whole statements, not just expressions
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'definition'
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p.126
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9958
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Recursive definition defines each instance from a previous instance
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'definition'
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p.126
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9960
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A stipulative definition lays down that an expression is to have a certain meaning
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'definition'
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p.126
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9957
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Ostensive definitions point to an object which an expression denotes
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p.102
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p.102
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6219
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The fallacy of composition is the assumption that what is true of the parts is true of the whole
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p.105
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p.105
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4782
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'All x are y' is equivalent to 'all non-y are non-x', so observing paper is white confirms 'ravens are black' [PG]
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p.111
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p.111
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6881
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Analytic philosophy studies the unimportant, and sharpens tools instead of using them
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p.114
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p.114
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6886
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Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid
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p.114
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p.114
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6884
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Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q'
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p.114
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p.114
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6882
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Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false
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p.114
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p.114
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6885
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Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case
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p.115
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p.115
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6883
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Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses
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p.150
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p.150
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6896
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Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended
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p.151
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p.151
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6897
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Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing
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p.169
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p.169
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6877
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Entailment is logical requirement; it may be not(p and not-q), but that has problems
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p.179
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p.179
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5452
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'Essentialism' is opposed to existentialism, and claims there is a human nature
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p.179
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p.179
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5449
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Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths
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p.194
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p.194
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6898
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Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional
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p.214
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p.214
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6888
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Fuzzy logic is based on the notion that there can be membership of a set to some degree
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p.225
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p.225
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4783
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Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [PG]
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p.247
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p.247
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5439
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The 'hermeneutic circle' says parts and wholes are interdependent, and so cannot be interpreted
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p.270
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p.270
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6880
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Strict implication says false propositions imply everything, and everything implies true propositions
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p.270
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p.270
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6879
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'Material implication' is defined as 'not(p and not-q)', but seems to imply a connection between p and q
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p.272
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p.272
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6899
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The references of indexicals ('there', 'now', 'I') depend on the circumstances of utterance
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p.279
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p.279
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6878
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A person who 'infers' draws the conclusion, but a person who 'implies' leaves it to the audience
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p.318
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p.318
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6887
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Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage
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p.464
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p.464
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6890
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Quantifiers turn an open sentence into one to which a truth-value can be assigned
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p.518
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p.518
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6452
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'Sense-data' arrived in 1910, but it denotes ideas in Locke, Berkeley and Hume
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p.585
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p.585
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6889
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Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false
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