green numbers give full details.
|
back to list of philosophers
|
expand these ideas
Ideas of Alexander Miller, by Text
[British, fl. 1998, Taught at Birmingham University, then at Macquarie University, Sydney.]
|
1998
|
Philosophy of Language
|
|
2.1.1
|
p.24
|
7306
|
If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names
|
|
4.2
|
p.115
|
7315
|
'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction
|
|
4.7
|
p.132
|
7322
|
Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them
|
|
5.3
|
p.166
|
7323
|
If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax
|
|
6.1
|
p.178
|
7324
|
Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together?
|
|
6.2
|
p.181
|
7325
|
Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity
|
|
8.7
|
p.271
|
7329
|
Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth
|
|
8.7
|
p.271
|
7328
|
The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true
|
|
9.2
|
p.281
|
7333
|
The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval
|