| 1987 | Lewis on Perdurance versus Endurance |
| p.191 | 15541 | Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lewis] |
| 1995 | Locke on Human Understanding |
| Ch.3 | p.35 | 7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation |
| Ch.3 | p.59 | 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object |
| Ch.4 | p.71 | 7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities |
| Ch.5 | p.103 | 7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) |
| Ch.7 | p.146 | 7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication |
| Ch.7 | p.163 | 7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal |
| Ch.7 | p.168 | 7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" |
| 1995 | Things |
| p.871 | 7783 | Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist |
| 1998 | The Possibility of Metaphysics |
| p.217 | 16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lynch/Glasgow] |
| p.262 | 16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Hofweber] |
| Pref | p.-4 | 8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs |
| 1 | p.22 | 9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Mumford] |
| 1.4 | p.14 | 8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) |
| 2.10 | p.51 | 8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality |
| 2.3 | p.35 | 8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? |
| 2.3 | p.37 | 8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions |
| 2.3 | p.39 | 8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value |
| 2.9 | p.49 | 8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous |
| 3.3 | p.62 | 8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity |
| 3.9 | p.75 | 8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them |
| 4.4 | p.97 | 8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects |
| 5 | p.106 | 8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times |
| 5.3 | p.115 | 8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? |
| 5.8 | p.132 | 8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? |
| 7 | p.155 | 8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects |
| 7.1 | p.157 | 8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual |
| 7.5 | p.166 | 8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? |
| 7.9 | p.173 | 8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change |
| 8.2 | p.179 | 8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance |
| 8.2 | p.179 | 8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former |
| 8.2 | p.179 | 8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change |
| 8.3 | p.180 | 8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent |
| 8.3 | p.181 | 8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence |
| 8.3 | p.182 | 8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects |
| 9.3 | p.197 | 8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not |
| 9.5 | p.200 | 8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind |
| 9.5 | p.200 | 8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter |
| 9.5 | p.200 | 8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted |
| 9.5 | p.201 | 8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence |
| 9.6 | p.203 | 8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature |
| 9.8 | p.206 | 8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? |
| 9.8 | p.207 | 8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? |
| 9.8 | p.208 | 8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? |
| 1.3 | p.9 | 16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is |
| 1.3 | p.10 | 16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects |
| 1.3 | p.11 | 16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions |
| 1.3 | p.12 | 16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit |
| 1.4 | p.14 | 15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws |
| 10 | p.210 | 8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality |
| 10 | p.210 | 8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa |
| 10.1 | p.211 | 8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts |
| 10.2 | p.213 | 8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them |
| 10.2 | p.213 | 8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) |
| 10.3 | p.214 | 8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another |
| 10.3 | p.215 | 8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it |
| 10.3 | p.215 | 8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types |
| 10.3 | p.216 | 8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable |
| 10.4 | p.217 | 8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables |
| 10.5 | p.220 | 8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations |
| 10.6 | p.221 | 8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members |
| 10.6 | p.223 | 8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? |
| 10.7 | p.224 | 8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 |
| 11 | p.228 | 8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation |
| 11 | p.228 | 8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria |
| 11.2 | p.232 | 8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? |
| 11.2 | p.234 | 8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions |
| 11.3 | p.234 | 8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations |
| 11.3 | p.236 | 8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects |
| 11.5 | p.243 | 8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents |
| 11.6 | p.245 | 8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items |
| 12 | p.248 | 8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? |
| 12.1 | p.250 | 8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects |
| 12.3 n8 | p.254 | 8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions |
| 12.4 | p.258 | 8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? |
| p.181 | p.14 | 13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Westerhoff] |
| 2000 | Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind |
| Intro | p.1 | 6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? |
| 70 | p.70 | 6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? |
| Ch. 2 | p.13 | 6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' |
| Ch. 2 | p.13 | 6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change |
| Ch. 3 | p.43 | 6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief |
| Ch. 3 | p.49 | 6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain |
| Ch. 3 | p.54 | 6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion |
| Ch. 3 | p.59 | 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? |
| Ch. 3 | p.61 | 6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires |
| Ch. 3 | p.67 | 6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' |
| Ch. 3 | p.67 | 6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties |
| Ch. 3 | p.68 | 6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes |
| Ch. 4 | p.73 | 6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief |
| Ch. 4 | p.82 | 6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical |
| Ch. 4 | p.89 | 6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) |
| Ch. 4 | p.92 | 6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future |
| Ch. 4 | p.101 | 6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory |
| Ch. 5 | p.119 | 6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? |
| Ch. 6 | p.136 | 6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form |
| Ch. 6 | p.145 | 6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common |
| Ch. 6 | p.147 | 6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external |
| Ch. 6 | p.148 | 6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity |
| Ch. 6 | p.153 | 6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations |
| Ch. 6 | p.153 | 6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality |
| Ch. 6 | p.154 | 6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information |
| Ch. 6 | p.156 | 6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong |
| Ch. 6 | p.157 | 6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight |
| Ch. 7 | p.172 | 6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation |
| Ch. 7 | p.176 | 6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech |
| Ch. 8 | p.201 | 6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event |
| Ch. 8 | p.201 | 6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background |
| Ch. 8 | p.203 | 6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth |
| Ch. 8 | p.216 | 6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual |
| Ch. 8 | p.220 | 6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge |
| Ch. 8 | p.228 | 6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods |
| Ch. 9 | p.230 | 6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity |
| Ch. 9 | p.250 | 6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent |
| Ch. 9 | p.254 | 6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation |
| Ch. 9 | p.255 | 6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice |
| Ch. 9 | p.257 | 6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes |
| Ch.10 | p.264 | 6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge |
| Ch.10 | p.266 | 6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' |
| Ch.10 | p.277 | 6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory |
| Ch.10 | p.287 | 6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body |
| Ch.10 | p.289 | 6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation |
| 2002 | A Survey of Metaphysics |
| p.184 | 14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Mumford/Anjum] |
| p.100 | p.100 | 4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) |
| p.11 | p.11 | 4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility |
| p.113 | p.113 | 4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? |
| p.121 | p.121 | 4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds |
| p.15 | p.15 | 4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations |
| p.15 | p.15 | 4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete |
| p.161 | p.161 | 4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual |
| p.173 | p.173 | 4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration |
| p.176 | p.176 | 4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition |
| p.179 | p.179 | 4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case |
| p.182 | p.182 | 4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity |
| p.190 | p.190 | 4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) |
| p.191 | p.191 | 4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible |
| p.2 | p.2 | 4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole |
| p.2 | p.2 | 4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation |
| p.211 | p.211 | 4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers |
| p.219 | p.219 | 4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology |
| p.225 | p.225 | 4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time |
| p.229 | p.229 | 4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time |
| p.233 | p.233 | 4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology |
| p.234 | p.234 | 4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? |
| p.241 | p.241 | 4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics |
| p.242 | p.242 | 4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects |
| p.245 | p.245 | 4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things |
| p.254 | p.254 | 4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract |
| p.26 | p.26 | 4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship |
| p.264 | p.264 | 4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? |
| p.27 | p.27 | 4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist |
| p.290 | p.290 | 4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member |
| p.31 | p.31 | 4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). |
| p.352 | p.352 | 4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist |
| p.355 | p.355 | 4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set |
| p.361 | p.361 | 4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere |
| p.362 | p.362 | 4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness |
| p.367 | p.367 | 4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles |
| p.368 | p.368 | 4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location |
| p.368 | p.368 | 4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations |
| p.372 | p.372 | 4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence |
| p.375 | p.375 | 4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects |
| p.375 | p.375 | 4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth |
| p.44 | p.44 | 4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [PG] |
| p.59 | p.59 | 4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance |
| p.62 | p.62 | 4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) |
| p.70 | p.70 | 4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material |
| 2003 | Individuation |
| p.87 | 8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example |
| 12 | p.93 | 8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole |
| 5 | p.81 | 8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination |
| 8 | p.86 | 8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction |
| 2008 | Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence |
| Intro | p.23 | 13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency |
| 1 | p.28 | 13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical |
| 1 | p.33 | 13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things |
| 2 | p.35 | 13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them |
| 2 | p.35 | 13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category |
| 2 | p.39 | 13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing |
| 2009 | An essentialist approach to Truth-making |
| p.202 | p.202 | 18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth |
| p.207 | p.207 | 18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities |
| p.212 | p.212 | 18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals |
| 2013 | What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths? |
| 1 | p.1 | 16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' |
| 1 | p.1 | 16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity |
| 1 | p.2 | 16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities |
| 2 | p.5 | 16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously |
| 2 | p.6 | 16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist |
| 6 | p.16 | 16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences |
| 6 | p.17 | 16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle |
| 6 | p.18 | 16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse |
| 6 | p.20 | 16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary |
| 6 | p.20 | 16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted |
| 6 | p.21 | 16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct |
| 6 | p.21 | 16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths |
| 6 | p.22 | 16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze |
| 6 | p.23 | 16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right |
| 6 | p.23 | 16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine |
| 6 | p.24 | 16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions |
| 7 | p.26 | 16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about |
| 7 | p.28 | 16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition |
| 7 | p.28 | 16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that |