| 1979 | The Trouble with Possible Worlds |
| 02 | p.279 | 15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist |
| 02 | p.281 | 15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle |
| 09 | p.302 | 15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties |
| 09 | p.302 | 15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility |
| 09 | p.304 | 15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events |
| 12 | p.312 | 15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties |
| 1987 | Consciousness |
| 1.1 | p.2 | 6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws |
| 1.1 | p.3 | 6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals |
| 4.0 | p.37 | 6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics |
| 4.3 | p.42 | 6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose |
| 4.3 | p.42 | 6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens |
| 4.3 | p.42 | 6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens |
| 4.3 | p.43 | 6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy |
| 4.3 | p.43 | 6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones |
| 4.3 | p.43 | 6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction |
| 4.4 | p.45 | 6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories |
| 4.4 | p.45 | 6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws |
| 4.4 | p.45 | 6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees |
| 4.4 | p.46 | 6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing |
| 5.4 | p.54 | 6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic |
| 5.4 | p.57 | 6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations |
| 5.4 | p.57 | 6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees |
| 5.4 | p.59 | 6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction |
| 5.4 | p.60 | 6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function |
| 5.5 | p.62 | 6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction |
| 5.6 | p.69 | 6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false |
| 8.4 | p.90 | 6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory |
| 8.4 | p.91 | 6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects |
| 8.5 | p.96 | 6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time |
| n1.6 | p.131 | 6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" |
| 1999 | Introduction - Ontology |
| p.10 | p.10 | 5501 | People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms |
| p.5 | p.5 | 5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities |
| p.6 | p.6 | 5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental |
| p.9 | p.9 | 5499 | A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism |
| p.9 | p.9 | 5500 | Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above |
| 2000 | Philosophy of Language |
| Ch. 1 | p.13 | 7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. |
| Ch. 6 | p.94 | 7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name |
| Ch. 6 | p.94 | 7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? |
| Ch. 8 | p.120 | 7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification |
| Ch. 9 | p.136 | 7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation |
| Ch. 9 | p.142 | 7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' |
| Ch.10 | p.150 | 7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true |
| Ch.10 | p.153 | 7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation |