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Ideas of Gabriel M.A. Segal, by Text

[American, fl. 2000, At King's College, London.]

2000 A Slim Book about Narrow Content
1.4 p.10 Maybe content involves relations to a language community
1.4 p.10 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them?
1.6 p.14 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary?
1.6 p.16 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious
1.7 p.19 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ
2.1 p.24 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible
2.1 p.24 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires
2.2 p.31 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference
2.2 p.37 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions
2.2 p.43 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth
3.2 p.73 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users
3.3 p.77 Concepts can survive a big change in extension
4.1 p.95 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things
4.1 p.97 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms
5 p.123 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts
5 p.127 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints
5.1 p.131 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds
5.3 p.150 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality