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Ideas of Georges Rey, by Text

[American, fl. 1992, Professor at the University of Maryland.]

1997 Contemporary Philosophy of Mind
1.1 p.14 The three theories are reduction, dualism, eliminativism
1.1.1 p.15 Varieties of singular terms are used to designate token particulars
1.1.2 p.19 Arithmetic and unconscious attitudes have no qualia
1.1.2 p.19 Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred)
1.2.1 p.22 If you explain water as H2O, you have reduced water, but not eliminated it
10.1.1 p.265 Animals may also use a language of thought
10.1.2 p.266 Images can't replace computation, as they need it
10.2.1 p.271 Is the room functionally the same as a Chinese speaker?
10.2.3 p.274 Searle is guilty of the fallacy of division - attributing a property of the whole to a part
11.1 p.289 Our desires become important when we have desires about desires
11.2.2 p.292 Self-consciousness may just be nested intentionality
11.4.2 p.300 If qualia have no function, their attachment to thoughts is accidental
11.6.1 p.307 Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind?
11.6.1 p.308 Are qualia a type of propositional attitude?
11.7.1 p.310 If colour fits a cone mapping hue, brightness and saturation, rotating the cone could give spectrum inversion
2.1 p.42 Is consciousness 40Hz oscillations in layers 5 and 6 of the visual cortex?
2.1 p.43 Why qualia, and why this particular quale?
2.3 p.46 Physics requires the existence of properties, and also the abstract objects of arithmetic
2.4 p.49 The Indiscernibility of Identicals is a truism; but the Identity of Indiscernibles depends on possible identical worlds
2.5.3 p.54 Problem-solving clearly involves manipulating images
2.5.4 p.55 Dualist privacy is seen as too deep for even telepathy to reach
2.5.6 p.58 Referential Opacity says truth is lost when you substitute one referring term ('mother') for another ('Jocasta')
2.7 p.64 Can identity explain reason, free will, non-extension, intentionality, subjectivity, experience?
3.2.2 p.84 Experiments prove that people are often unaware of their motives
3.2.2 p.85 Brain damage makes the unreliability of introspection obvious
3.3 p.89 Intentional explanations are always circular
4 p.96 Behaviourism is eliminative, or reductionist, or methodological
4.1.1 p.99 Animal learning is separate from their behaviour
4.1.4 p.103 Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment
4.2.1 p.110 A simple chaining device can't build sentences containing 'either..or', or 'if..then'
4.2.1 p.113 We train children in truth, not in grammar
4.2.4 p.119 Children speak 90% good grammar
4.3 p.122 Empiricism says experience is both origin and justification of all knowledge
4.3 p.124 How are stimuli and responses 'similar'?
4.3 p.126 Animals map things over time as well as over space
4.3 p.126 Good grammar can't come simply from stimuli
4.3 p.127 Anything bears a family resemblance to a game, but obviously not anything counts as one
5.3 p.154 Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind
5.3 p.154 Maybe behaviourists should define mental states as a group
5.4 p.156 A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be
7.1.4 p.189 If a normal person lacked a brain, would you say they had no mind?
7.2.2 p.195 Homuncular functionalism (e.g. Freud) could be based on simpler mechanical processes
8.5 p.218 CRTT is good on deduction, but not so hot on induction, abduction and practical reason
8.6 p.221 Free will isn't evidence against a theory of thought if there is no evidence for free will
8.6 p.221 If reason could be explained in computational terms, there would be no need for the concept of 'free will'
8.8 p.226 Pattern recognition is puzzling for computation, but makes sense for connectionism
8.8 p.226 Connectionism assigns numbers to nodes and branches, and plots the outcomes
8.8 p.227 Connectionism explains well speed of perception and 'graceful degradation'
8.8 p.231 Connectionism explains irrationality (such as the Gamblers' Fallacy) quite well
9.1.2 p.239 The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal"
9.1.2 p.240 Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts
9.1.3 p.241 One computer program could either play chess or fight a war
9.2 p.241 Simple externalism is that the meaning just is the object
9.2.1 p.242 Causal theories of reference (by 'dubbing') don't eliminate meanings in the heads of dubbers
9.2.2 p.243 If meaning and reference are based on causation, then virtually everything has meaning
Int.2 p.3 Dualism and physicalism explain nothing, and don't suggest any research
Int.2 p.5 It's not at all clear that explanation needs to stop anywhere
Int.2 p.6 Physicalism offers something called "complexity" instead of mental substance
Int.3 p.7 Human behaviour can show law-like regularity, which eliminativism can't explain
p.322 p.322 Abduction could have true data and a false conclusion, and may include data not originally mentioned
2013 The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction
1.2 p.3 Analytic judgements can't be explained by contradiction, since that is what is assumed
1.2 p.3 'Married' does not 'contain' its symmetry, nor 'bigger than' its transitivity
3.7 p.9 Analytic statements are undeniable (because of meaning), rather than unrevisable
3.7 p.9 The traditional a priori is justified without experience; post-Quine it became unrevisable by experience
4.1 p.11 If we claim direct insight to what is analytic, how do we know it is not sub-consciously empirical?
4.2 p.11 Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena
4.3 p.12 The meaning properties of a term are those which explain how the term is typically used
4.4 p.13 An intrinsic language faculty may fix what is meaningful (as well as grammatical)
4.4 p.14 Research throws doubts on the claimed intuitions which support analyticity