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Ideas of David J.Chalmers, by Text
[Australian, b.1966, Taught at the University of Indiana. Professor at Australian National University.]
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p.7
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9318
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Phenomenal consciousness is fundamental, with no possible nonphenomenal explanation [Kriegel/Williford]
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p.21
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14708
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Rationalist 2D semantics posits necessary relations between meaning, apriority, and possibility [Schroeter]
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Intro
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p.-7
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2386
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Hard Problem: why brains experience things
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1.1.3
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p.17
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2389
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Sometimes we don't notice our pains
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1.1.3
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p.19
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2390
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We attribute beliefs to people in order to explain their behaviour
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1.1.5
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p.28
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2391
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Can we be aware but not conscious?
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1.2.1
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p.33
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2392
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Properties supervene if you can't have one without the other
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1.2.1
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p.35
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2393
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Logical supervenience is when one set of properties must be accompanied by another set
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1.2.1
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p.36
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2394
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Natural supervenience is when one set of properties is always accompanied by another set
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1.2.1
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p.38
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2395
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Zombies imply natural but not logical supervenience
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1.2.2
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p.43
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2396
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Reductive explanation is not the be-all and the end-all of explanation
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1.2.2
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p.45
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2397
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'Perception' means either an action or a mental state
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1.2.3
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p.48
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2398
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Reduction requires logical supervenience
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1.2.4
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p.56
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13956
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Kripke is often taken to be challenging a priori insights into necessity
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1.2.4
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p.57
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13958
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The 'primary intension' is non-empirical, and fixes extensions based on the actual-world reference
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1.2.4
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p.59
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13959
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The 'secondary intension' is determined by rigidifying (as H2O) the 'water' picked out in the actual world
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1.2.4
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p.59
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2399
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Meaning has split into primary ("watery stuff"), and secondary counterfactual meaning ("H2O")
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1.2.4
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p.60
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13957
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Primary and secondary intensions are the a priori (actual) and a posteriori (counterfactual) aspects of meaning
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1.2.4
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p.62
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13960
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In two-dimensional semantics we have two aspects to truth in virtue of meaning
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1.2.4
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p.63
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13961
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We have 'primary' truth-conditions for the actual world, and derived 'secondary' ones for counterfactual worlds
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1.2.4
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p.63
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13962
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Two-dimensional semantics gives a 'primary' and 'secondary' proposition for each statement
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1.2.4
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p.68
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13963
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Maybe logical possibility does imply conceivability - by an ideal mind
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1.2.5
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p.82
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2400
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Is intentionality just causal connections?
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1.2.5
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p.85
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18403
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Indexicals may not be objective, but they are a fact about the world as I see it
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1.2.5
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p.87
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2401
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All facts are either physical, experiential, laws of nature, second-order final facts, or indexical facts about me
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2.1
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p.31
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16048
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Physicalism says in any two physically indiscernible worlds the positive facts are the same [Bennett,K]
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2.3.1.2
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p.100
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2402
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It seems possible to invert qualia
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2.3.1.3
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p.101
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2403
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Nothing in physics even suggests consciousness
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2.3.1.4
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p.103
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2404
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Nothing external shows whether a mouse is conscious
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2.4.1
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p.125
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2405
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Perhaps consciousness is physically based, but not logically required by that base
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2.4.1
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p.130
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2407
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One can wrongly imagine two things being non-identical even though they are the same (morning/evening star)
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2.4.1
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p.130
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2406
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H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that
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2.4.2
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p.137
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16424
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Strong metaphysical necessity allows fewer possible worlds than logical necessity
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2.4.2
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p.137
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16425
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Metaphysical necessity is a bizarre, brute and inexplicable constraint on possibilities
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2.4.2
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p.137
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16426
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How can we know the metaphysical impossibilities; the a posteriori only concerns this world
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2.4.2
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p.138
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16427
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Presumably God can do anything which is logically possible
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2.4.4
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p.156
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2409
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Maybe dualist interaction is possible at the quantum level?
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2.4.6
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p.170
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2411
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Supervenience makes interaction laws possible
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2.5.2
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p.177
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2412
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Can we explain behaviour without consciousness?
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2.5.2
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p.180
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2413
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If I can have a zombie twin, my own behaviour doesn't need consciousness
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2.5.5
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p.197
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2414
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When distracted we can totally misjudge our own experiences
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3.6.3
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p.227
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2415
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In blindsight both qualia and intentionality are missing
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3.6.5
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p.244
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2416
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What turns awareness into consciousness?
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3.7.1
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p.248
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2417
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Does consciousness arise from fine-grained non-reductive functional organisation?
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3.7.2
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p.251
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2418
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The Chinese Mind doesn't seem conscious, but then nor do brains from outside
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3.7.3
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p.259
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2419
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Why should qualia fade during silicon replacement?
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3.8.3
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p.289
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2422
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The structure of the retina has already simplified the colour information which hits it
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3.8.4
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p.295
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2423
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Going down the scale, where would consciousness vanish?
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3.8.4
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p.297
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2424
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It is odd if experience is a very recent development
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3.8.5
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p.306
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2426
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Why are minds homogeneous and brains fine-grained?
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4.9.4
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p.323
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2428
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Maybe the whole Chinese Room understands Chinese, though the person doesn't
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n 2.20
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p.364
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2429
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Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable
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2002
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Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?
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p.129
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16473
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Modal Rationalism: conceivability gives a priori access to modal truths [Stalnaker]
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p.813
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19258
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Evaluate primary possibility from some world, and secondary possibility from this world [Vaidya]
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2004
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Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics
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p.165
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p.24
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14712
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A sentence is a priori if no possible way the world might actually be could make it false
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p.180-4
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p.25
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14713
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Truth in a scenario is the negation in that scenario being a priori incoherent
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2006
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Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics
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p.108
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14739
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'Water' is two-dimensionally inconstant, with different intensions in different worlds [Sider]
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