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Ideas of Christopher Peacocke, by Text

[British, b.1950, Formerly of New College,Oxford University, then at New York University, then University College,London.]

1992 A Study of Concepts
p.31 Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Machery]
p.45 Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Machery]
p.47 Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery]
p.164 Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Greco]
p.165 A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Horwich]
2.1 p.44 Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it
3.2 p.71 A concept is just what it is to possess that concept
3.3 p.77 Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts
3.3 p.89 Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences
5.3 p.135 An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized
6.1 p.149 Most people can't even define a chair
6.2 p.152 Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it
7.2 p.194 Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it
2000 Explaining the A Priori
p.267 p.58 The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things
2005 Rationale and Maxims in Study of Concepts
p.169 p.5 If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire?
2008 Truly Understood
Intro p.1 Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth
Intro p.3 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference
2.1 p.54 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions
2.2 p.60 Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality
2.3 p.76 Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms
4.3 p.135 Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional