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Ideas of Keith Campbell, by Text

[Australian, fl. 1990, At Sydney University.]

1981 The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars
1 p.126 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue
1 p.126 Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented
1 p.127 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars
2 p.128 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes
3 p.129 Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another
3 p.129 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes
3 p.129 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved
5 p.132 Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible
5 p.132 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't!
6 p.133 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else
6 p.134 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars
6 p.135 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect
7 p.136 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size
8 p.138 Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes