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Ideas of Robert C. Stalnaker, by Text

[American, b.1940, Professor at Cornell University, then at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.]

1968 A Theory of Conditionals
p.34 p.18 14286 In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false
p.34 p.18 14285 A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs
1970 works
p.82 10994 Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Read]
1976 Possible Worlds
p.303 15793 We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Lycan]
1978 Assertion
p.37 14718 An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Schroeter]
p.126 18052 An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Magidor]
1979 Anti-essentialism
p.71 p.71 12761 An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists
p.71 p.72 12762 Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics
p.73 p.73 12763 Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential
p.76 p.76 12764 For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects
p.79 p.79 12765 Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball
p.85 p.85 12766 Logical space is abstracted from the actual world
1987 Counterparts and Identity
p.159 18823 To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Rumfitt]
1 p.112 16409 Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory
2 p.113 16410 Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension
2 p.114 16411 If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time
2 p.118 16412 If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism
1997 Reference and Necessity
Intro p.166 16396 Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical
§1 p.166 16403 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts
2 p.170 16397 If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways
2 p.171 16399 Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains
2 p.171 16398 Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries
3 p.172 16401 To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true
4 p.175 16404 In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent
4 p.176 16406 If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean
4 p.176 16405 To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient?
5 p.182 16407 Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular
5 p.185 16408 Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals
2003 Conceptual truth and metaphysical necessity
1 p.202 16421 Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part
1 p.203 16423 Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of
1 p.203 16422 The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts
2 p.204 16428 Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract
2 p.205 16429 A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time
2 p.205 16430 Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension
4 p.209 16431 In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content
5 p.211 16432 One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content
2010 Merely Possible Propositions
p.22 p.22 14616 A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations
p.28 p.28 14617 Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist
2012 Mere Possibilities
Pref p.-6 16433 Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones?
1 p.1 16434 Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist
1 p.2 16436 Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics
1 p.3 16437 Possible worlds are properties
1.1 p.4 16438 Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them
1.1 p.4 16439 A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location
1.1 p.5 16440 I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance
1.2 p.11 16443 Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified
1.2 p.11 16442 I take propositions to be truth conditions
1.2 p.11 16444 Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure
1.2 p.13 16445 I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space
2 p.22 16446 Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist
2 p.24 16447 A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth
2.2 p.30 16448 Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it
2.4 p.38 16449 In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members
3 p.52 16450 Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions
3.4 p.60 16452 Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually
3.6 p.71 16453 The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties
3.6 p.71 16454 Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics
4 p.91 16461 We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language
4.2 p.98 16464 We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities
4.2 p.100 16465 In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't
4.3 p.103 16466 Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false
4.3 p.111 16467 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human
4.3 n17 p.112 16468 Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities
4.4 p.118 16471 I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties
5 p.133 16474 How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know?