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Ideas of Paul Horwich, by Text

[British, b.1947, At University College, London, and New York University.]

1987 Lewis's Programme
p.208 p.208 Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around
p208 p.208 Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis
1990 Truth (2nd edn)
p.30 Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Davidson]
Ch.1 p.1 The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily
Ch.2.11 p.46 No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth
Ch.2.17 p.57 The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory
Ch.2.8 p.36 The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth?
Ch.2.9 p.39 The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p
Ch.5.22 n1 p.69 We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning
Ch.6.30 p.88 Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments
Ch.6.31 p.91 There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture
Ch.6.32 p.93 Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage
Ch.7.35 p.104 Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction
Concl p.118 Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them
1992 Bayesianism
p.41 p.41 Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E)
p.42 p.42 Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence
2000 Stipulation, Meaning and Apriority
11 p.168 A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds
12 p.169 Understanding needs a priori commitment
12 p.169 Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable
2 p.151 How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition?
8 p.162 A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge
8 p.162 Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around
9 p.163 If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle