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Ideas of Frank Jackson, by Text

[Australian, b.1943, Professor at the Australian National University.]

1977 Statements about Universals
p.89 p.89 8499 Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars
p.90 p.90 8500 Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned
1979 On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals
p.22 14288 'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Edgington]
p.404 13769 Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Edgington]
1981 Conditionals and Possibilia
p.37 13858 The truth-functional account of conditionals is right, if the antecedent is really acceptable [Edgington]
1982 Epiphenomenal Qualia
p.166 7880 If a blind persons suddenly sees a kestrel, that doesn't make visual and theoretical kestrels different [Papineau]
p.399 7378 No one bothers to imagine what it would really be like to have ALL the physical information [Dennett]
§1 p.442 7377 Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something
1986 What Mary Didn't Know
p.159 4894 I say Mary does not have new knowledge, but knows an old fact in a new way [Perry]
p.166 4895 Is it unfair that physicalist knowledge can be written down, but dualist knowledge can't be [Perry]
§1.4 p.15 4886 Mary knows all the physical facts of seeing red, but experiencing it is new knowledge
1987 Conditionals
p.23 14289 There are some assertable conditionals one would reject if one learned the antecedent [Edgington]
1998 From Metaphysics to Ethics
Ch.1 p.5 7005 Something can only have a place in a preferred account of things if it is entailed by the account
Ch.1 p.11 6975 Possible worlds could be concrete, abstract, universals, sentences, or properties
Ch.1 p.14 6976 In physicalism, the psychological depends on the physical, not the other way around
Ch.1 p.19 6977 Egocentric or de se content seems to be irreducibly so
Ch.1 p.26 6979 Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences
Ch.2 p.28 6980 Conceptual analysis studies whether one story is made true by another story
Ch.2 p.47 6982 Long arithmetic calculations show the a priori can be fallible
Ch.3 p.56 6983 Intuitions about possibilities are basic to conceptual analysis
Ch.3 p.57 6984 Smooth reductions preserve high-level laws in the lower level
Ch.3 p.60 6985 Analysis is finding necessary and sufficient conditions by studying possible cases
Ch.3 p.68 6986 Is the dependence of the psychological on the physical a priori or a posteriori?
Ch.3 p.70 6987 We should not multiply senses of necessity beyond necessity
Ch.3 p.73 6989 I can understand "He has a beard", without identifying 'he', and hence the truth conditions
Ch.3 p.79 6990 Keep distinct the essential properties of water, and application conditions for the word 'water'
Ch.3 p.89 6991 We examine objects to determine colour; we do not introspect
Ch.3 n25 p.71 6988 Mathematical sentences are a problem in a possible-worlds framework
Ch.4 p.97 6993 Redness is a property, but only as a presentation to normal humans
Ch.4 n3 p.92 6992 If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible
Ch.5 p.118 6994 Truth supervenes on being
Ch.5 p.118 6995 Successful predication supervenes on nature
Ch.5 p.130 6996 Folk psychology covers input, internal role, and output
Ch.5 p.131 6997 Moral functionalism says moral terms get their meaning from their role in folk morality
Ch.5 p.133 6998 Folk morality does not clearly distinguish between doing and allowing
Ch.5 p.134 6999 It is hard to justify the huge difference in our judgements of abortion and infanticide
Ch.5 p.136 7000 Which are prior - thin concepts like right, good, ought; or thick concepts like kindness, equity etc.?
p.22 p.22 6978 Baldness is just hair distribution, but the former is indeterminate, unlike the latter
p.28 p.19 14707 Conceptual analysis is needed to establish that metaphysical reductions respect original meanings [Schroeter]
2006 Conditionals
'Equiv' p.212 14352 '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components
'Equiv' p.213 14354 When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth
'Equiv' p.213 14355 (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T
'Equiv' p.213 14353 Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F
'Famous' p.216 14358 In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated
'Indicative' p.221 14360 Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives?
'No-truth' p.219 14359 Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions
'Possible' p.214 14356 We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance
'Possible' p.215 14357 Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false
2010 Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori
1 p.257 14631 How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false?
1 p.257 14632 Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem
5 p.261 14633 How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic?
6 p.261 14635 An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears