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Ideas of Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, by Text

[American, fl. 1995, At Loyola University, Marymount; then at the University of Oklahoma.]

1996 Virtues of the Mind
I 1.2 p.23 Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused
I 1.2 p.29 Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine
I 2 p.29 Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding
I 4.2 p.66 Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so
I 4.2 p.70 Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness
II Intro p.77 Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue
II 2.1 p.89 Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues
II 2.2 p.93 The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having
II 2.2 p.99 Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked
II 2.3 p.105 A virtue must always have a corresponding vice
II 2.4 p.107 Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [PG]
II 2.6 p.131 Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims
II 2.7 p.137 Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends
II 3.1 p.144 The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful
II 3.1 p.148 Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples)
II 3.1 p.149 Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence
II 3.1 p.152 We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices
II 3.2 p.158 For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly
II 4.1.2 p.176 A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them
II 5.2 p.224 We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues
II 6.1 p.238 Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts
II 6.1 p.241 A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person
II 7 p.255 Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment
III 1 p.260 Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable
III 1 p.261 The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action
III 2.1 p.266 Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition
III 2.1 p.266 Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory
III 2.1 p.269 Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths
III 2.2 p.274 Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding
III 3.1 p.283 For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap
III 3.1 p.289 Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked
III 3.1 p.298 We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth
III 3.2 p.295 Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck
p.59-60 p.100 Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Whitcomb]