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Ideas of M.R. Ayers, by Text

[British, fl. 1975, Professor at Oxford University, and fellow of Wadham College.]

1974 Individuals without Sortals
Intro p.113 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference
Intro p.114 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it
Intro p.117 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use
'Concl' p.144 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them
'Concl' p.144 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object
'Concl' p.146 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity
'Concl' p.147 Sortals basically apply to individuals
'Counting' p.139 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object'
'Counting' p.139 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope
'Prob' p.119 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too?
'Prob' p.120 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous
'Prob' p.122 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged
'Realist' vi p.131 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts
'Realist' vii p.131 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals?
'Realist' vii p.132 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity?