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Ideas of Gareth Evans, by Text
[British, 1946 - 1980, Wilde Reader at Oxford University. Died of cancer.]
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1973
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The Causal Theory of Names
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§I
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p.1
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9038
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We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes
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§I
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p.3
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9039
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If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit
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§I
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p.5
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9040
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Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs
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§I
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p.11
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9041
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The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation
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§I
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p.13
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5823
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The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it
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§II
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p.14
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5824
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How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation?
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§II
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p.17
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5825
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Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information
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§II
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p.18
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9042
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A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public
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§II
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p.21
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9043
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We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people
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p.397
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p.397
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7639
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The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally
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1978
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Can there be Vague Objects?
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p.11
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16129
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Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Lowe]
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p.107
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14484
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If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Thomasson]
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p.176
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16459
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Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries?
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p.319
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16460
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Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Lewis]
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p.319
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16457
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There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Lewis]
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4.7
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p.118
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16224
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There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [PG]
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1979
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Reference and Contingency
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p.3
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14895
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'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
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p.16
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11881
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Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Mackie,P]
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1980
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The Varieties of Reference
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p.88
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12580
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Experiences have no conceptual content [Greco]
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4.3
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p.1
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12575
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Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Peacocke]
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7.5
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p.229
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7643
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We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour
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p.104
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p.65
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16366
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The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything
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