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Ideas of Tim Crane, by Text

[British, b.1962, Professor at University College, London.]

1995 Causation
1.3 p.187 The regularity theory explains a causal event by other items than the two that are involved
1.4.2 p.193 Events are picked out by descriptions, and facts by whole sentences
1.4.2 p.193 A cause has its effects in virtue of its properties
2001 Elements of Mind
1.4 p.11 In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived.
1.5 p.18 Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things?
1.7 p.24 It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate
1.7 p.27 Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought
2.10 p.38 Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible
2.10 p.38 Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance
2.11 p.41 Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow
2.12 p.48 The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind
2.13 p.49 Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone
2.14 p.51 Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism
2.14 p.52 Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation
2.14 p.52 Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation
2.16 p.57 Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties
2.16 p.58 Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity
2.17 p.59 Properties are causes
2.17 p.61 If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one
2.18 p.64 The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague
2.18 p.65 If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete
2.18 p.66 Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic
2.19 p.66 Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution
2.9 p.35 Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence
3.22 p.74 Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes
3.24 p.81 Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object
3.25 p.83 Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional
3.26 p.89 The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question
3.26 p.89 The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality
3.28 p.95 Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere)
3.28 p.96 Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience
4.31 p.105 Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions
4.34 p.114 Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes
4.35 p.117 Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs
4.36 p.120 The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent
4.37 p.126 The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false.
5.40 p.131 If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see
5.42 p.137 The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum
5.42 p.138 The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects
5.42 p.139 One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine
5.43 p.142 The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes
5.43 p.143 If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes
5.44 p.146 With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same
5.44 p.147 Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it?
5.45 p.151 If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual