| 1930 | The Right and the Good |
| p.412 | 7259 | Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Dancy,J] |
| §I | p.3 | 5898 | 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' |
| §I | p.4 | 5899 | If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty |
| §I | p.6 | 5900 | We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty |
| §I | p.12 | 5904 | In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted |
| §II | p.17 | 5906 | Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences |
| §II | p.17 | 5905 | We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure |
| §II | p.20 | 5908 | Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance |
| §II | p.21 | 5909 | Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [PG] |
| §II | p.24 | 5910 | The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure |
| §II | p.29 | 5911 | Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics |
| §II | p.30 | 5912 | We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity |
| §II | p.40 | 5913 | The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics |
| §II | p.42 | 5914 | An act may be described in innumerable ways |
| §II App I | p.50 | 5915 | Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any |
| §II App I | p.53 | 5916 | Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things |
| §II App II | p.60 | 5917 | People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others |
| §IV | p.75 | 5920 | Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) |
| §IV | p.75 | 5918 | The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed |
| §IV | p.102 | 5919 | Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct |
| §IV | p.105 | 5921 | We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness |
| §IV | p.108 | 5922 | An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances |
| §IV | p.114 | 5923 | The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality |
| §IV | p.115 | 5924 | Identical objects must have identical value |
| §IV | p.120 | 5926 | The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it |
| §IV | p.127 | 5928 | Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events |
| §IV | p.127 | 5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions |
| §V | p.134 | 5929 | No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired |
| §V | p.138 | 5930 | All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious |
| §V | p.139 | 5931 | All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better |
| §V | p.140 | 5932 | The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge |
| §V | p.141 | 5933 | Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight |
| §VI | p.147 | 5937 | The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction |
| §VI | p.147 | 5936 | Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain |
| §VI | p.151 | 5938 | Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is |
| §VI | p.153 | 5939 | Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth |
| §VI | p.154 | 5940 | Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable |
| §VII | p.156 | 5941 | Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right |
| §VII | p.164 | 5942 | We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty |
| p.38 | p.23 | 18622 | Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being |