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Ideas of Nelson Goodman, by Text

[American, 1906 - 1998, Born in Somerville. Professor at Brandeis University. Also at Harvard University.]

1947 The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals
p.151 Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [McFetridge]
1951 The Structure of Appearance
p.27 Two objects can apparently make up quite distinct arrangements in sets [Burgess/Rosen]
p.230 If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Macdonald,C]
p.231 Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Macdonald,C]
Ch.6 p.227 If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Macdonald,C]
II.2 p.34 Classes are a host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities
p.26 p.9 The counties of Utah, and the state, and its acres, are in no way different
1954 Fact, Fiction and Forecast (4th ed)
p.19 Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Horsten/Pettigrew]
p.214 Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Putnam]
II.3 p.40 Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice
p.21 p.142 We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them
p.64 p.64 If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result
1968 Languages of Art (2nd edn)
p.178 Artistic symbols are judged by the fruitfulness of their classifications [Giovannelli]
p.186 p.174 A performance is only an instance of a work if there is not a single error
p.212 p.173 A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation
p.22-255 p.178 Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms
1976 The Languages of Art
p.603 Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Gardner]
1978 Ways of Worldmaking
1.2 p.2 If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one
1.2 p.3 We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another
1.3 p.6 Without words or other symbols, we have no world
1.4a p.8 Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness
1.4a p.9 A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it
1.4b p.11 Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely
1.4c p.12 Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system
1.4d p.15 We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit
1.4d p.15 Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps
1.5 p.19 Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved
1.6 p.20 Reality is largely a matter of habit
1.7 p.21 Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle
1.7 p.22 We don't recognise patterns - we invent them