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Ideas of G.E. Moore, by Text
[British, 1873 - 1958, Born in London. Friend of Russell. Professor at Cambridge University. Wittgenstein was a pupil.]
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1899
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The Nature of Judgement
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p.26
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6405
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Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Grayling]
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p.117
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7527
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Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Monk]
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p.117
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7526
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Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Monk]
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p.183
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22302
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Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Potter]
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p.2
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11050
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Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna]
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p.8
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5902
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For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Ross]
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p.15
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8039
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Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre]
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p.19
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5907
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Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross]
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p.108
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22151
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The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter]
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p.116
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5925
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The three main values are good, right and beauty [Ross]
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p.252
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8032
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Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre]
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p.252
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8033
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Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre]
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§027
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p.44
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11057
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It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good
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§044
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p.73
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11056
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The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good'
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§089
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p.147
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5903
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'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means
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§112
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p.187
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18676
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We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation
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p.210
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p.74
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21233
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The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire
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p.292
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6672
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Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Lowe]
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1911
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Some Main Problems of Philosophy
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Ch. 1
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p.1
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17992
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The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe.
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1919
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External and Internal Relations
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p.313
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21342
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A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Heil]
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1922
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Some Judgements of Perception
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p.228
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p.18
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20147
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Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger
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1939
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Proof of an External World
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p.1
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p.24
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6349
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I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand'
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