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Ideas of G.E. Moore, by Text

[British, 1873 - 1958, Born in London. Friend of Russell. Professor at Cambridge University. Wittgenstein was a pupil.]

1899 The Nature of Judgement
p.26 Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Grayling]
p.117 Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Monk]
p.117 Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Monk]
p.183 Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Potter]
1903 Principia Ethica
p.2 Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna]
p.8 For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Ross]
p.15 Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre]
p.19 Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross]
p.108 The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter]
p.116 The three main values are good, right and beauty [Ross]
p.252 Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre]
p.252 Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre]
027 p.44 It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good
044 p.73 The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good'
089 p.147 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means
112 p.187 We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation
p.210 p.74 The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire
1905 works
p.292 Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Lowe]
1911 Some Main Problems of Philosophy
Ch. 1 p.1 The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe.
1919 External and Internal Relations
p.313 A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Heil]
1922 Some Judgements of Perception
p.228 p.18 Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger
1939 Proof of an External World
p.1 p.24 I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand'