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Ideas of Charles Sanders Peirce, by Text

[American, 1839 - 1914, Born at Cambridge, Massachusetts. Educated at Harvard. Died at Milford.]

1877 The Fixation of Belief
p.83 21492 Realism is basic to the scientific method
p.126 6598 We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency
p. 7 p.7 6937 Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known
p. 8 p.8 6939 What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass)
p. 8 p.8 6938 Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones
p.10 p.10 6940 The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions
p.10 p.10 6941 We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false
p.11 p.11 6942 We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true
p.11 p.11 6943 A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt
p.11 p.11 6944 Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt
p.11 p.11 6945 Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue
p.12 p.12 6946 If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment
p.15 p.15 6947 Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe
p.18 p.18 6948 Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect
p.19 p.19 6949 If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction
1878 How to Make our Ideas Clear
p.29 14906 Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross]
EP i.132 p.31 19089 Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences
p.28 p.28 7660 We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits
p.38 p.38 7661 Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators
1880 What is a Leading Principle?
I p.130 14781 A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed
1891 The Architecture of Theories
p.319 p.319 14800 The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity
p.320 p.320 14801 Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results
p.321 p.321 14802 Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction
1892 The Doctrine of Necessity Examined
p.331 p.331 14803 The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature
p.333 p.333 14804 Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs
p.334 p.334 14805 Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms?
p.337 p.337 14806 If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance
1892 works
p.17 21489 Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Atkin]
p.69 21491 Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Atkin]
p.70 19095 Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Misak]
p.73 19097 Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Misak]
p.75 19102 Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Misak]
p.116 21494 If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin]
p.162 16376 The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular
p.220 10352 The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down
4 p.89 13498 Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Hart,WD]
CP 5.589 p.83 19107 Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog
CP5.567 p.104 21493 Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter
1895 On the Algebra of Logic
p.218 p.45 14303 Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false
1897 Concerning the Author
p.1 p.1 14764 I am saturated with the spirit of physical science
p.2 p.2 14767 The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine
p.2 p.2 14765 Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age
p.2 p.2 14766 Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science
p.3 p.3 14768 Infallibility in science is just a joke
1897 Logic as Semiotic: Theory of Signs
p.77 7634 Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Maund]
1898 The Approach to Metaphysics
p.311 p.311 14799 Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them
1898 The Nature of Mathematics
p.149 14789 Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience
I p.139 14782 Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience
II p.142 14783 Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means
II p.144 14784 Ethics is the science of aims
III p.146 14786 Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions
III p.146 14785 The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas
III p.147 14787 Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction
IV p.148 14788 Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract
1898 Reasoning and the Logic of Things
I p.109 19219 Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard
I p.109 19218 Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic
I p.110 19221 Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial
I p.110 19220 We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes!
I p.111 19222 Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons
I p.112 19224 Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it
I p.112 19223 We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions
I p.114 19226 We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts
I p.114 19225 I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below
I p.115 19227 Philosophy is a search for real truth
I p.115 19228 Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence
I p.116 19229 Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types
I p.119 19230 People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power
I p.120 19231 Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics
II p.126 19232 In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true
II p.128 19233 Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around
II p.139 19234 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general
II p.139 19235 How does induction get started?
II p.140 19236 Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions
III p.142 19237 Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true
III p.156 19238 The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes)
III p.161 19239 There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything
III p.161 19240 Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning
III p.163 19241 An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems
III p.163 19242 Generalization is the true end of life
IV p.165 19243 If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble
IV p.169 19244 Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless
IV p.171 19245 We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study
IV p.178 19246 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory
IV p.179 19247 The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth
V p.182 19248 Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation
V p.186 19249 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you
V p.188 19250 Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged
V p.194 19251 The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample
VI p.204 19252 Objective chance is the property of a distribution
VII p.234 19253 We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance
VII p.240 19254 Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution
VII p.241 19255 Generalisation is the great law of mind
VIII p.257 19256 Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing
VIII p.260 19257 Whatever is First must be sentient
1899 Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism
I p.43 14769 Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way
II p.56 14770 Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision
II p.57 14771 Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired
II p.57 14774 Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions
II p.57 14773 A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration
II p.57 14772 If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right
II p.59 14776 That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact
II p.59 14775 Numbers are just names devised for counting
1901 Abduction and Induction
I p.151 14790 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others
I p.153 14791 Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction
1903 Criterion of Validity in Reasoning
I p.121 14777 That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things
I p.125 14779 I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise
I p.125 14778 Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them
II p.127 14780 Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient
1905 Critical Common-Sensism
I p.294 14797 Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought
I p.295 14798 All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction
1905 Essentials of Pragmatism
I p.252 14792 A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life
I p.252 14793 The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications
I p.257 14794 Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt
1905 Issues of Pragmaticism
EP ii.246 p.169 19087 The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to
1906 Pragmatism in Retrospect
p.13 15335 Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten]
p.271 p.271 14795 Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths
p.288 p.288 14796 Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry