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Ideas of John Stuart Mill, by Text
[British, 1806 - 1873, Son of James Mill (close friend of Bentham). Member of Parliament in later life.]
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p.4
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12411
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Mill is too imprecise, and is restricted to simple arithmetic [Kitcher]
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p.9
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8625
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What physical facts could underlie 0 or 1, or very large numbers? [Frege]
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p.26
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4944
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Mill says names have denotation but not connotation [Kripke]
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p.35
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10391
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Causes and conditions are not distinct, because we select capriciously from among them
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p.37
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7762
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Proper names are just labels for persons or objects, and the meaning is the object [Lycan]
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p.99
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5201
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Mill says logic and maths is induction based on a very large number of instances [Ayer]
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p.112
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17086
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Surprisingly, empiricists before Mill ignore explanation, which seems to transcend experience [Ruben]
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p.150
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8345
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A cause is the total of all the conditions which inevitably produce the result
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p.201
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17091
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Explanation is fitting of facts into ever more general patterns of regularity [Ruben]
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p.244
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5656
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Empirical theories of arithmetic ignore zero, limit our maths, and need probability to get started [Frege]
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p.367
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9360
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If two black and two white objects in practice produced five, what colour is the fifth one? [Lewis,CI]
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1.04.3
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p.90
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17895
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Combining two distinct assertions does not necessarily lead to a single 'complex proposition'
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1.6.2
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p.123
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11156
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The essence is that without which a thing can neither be, nor be conceived to be
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2.6
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p.258
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9888
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Mill mistakes particular applications as integral to arithmetic, instead of general patterns [Dummett]
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2.6.2
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p.293
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9796
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Things possess the properties of numbers, as quantity, and as countable parts
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2.6.2
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p.293
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9795
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Numbers have generalised application to entities (such as bodies or sounds)
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2.6.2
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p.293
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9794
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There are no such things as numbers in the abstract
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2.6.2
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p.295
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9798
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Different parcels made from three pebbles produce different actual sensations
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2.6.2
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p.295
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9797
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'2 pebbles and 1 pebble' and '3 pebbles' name the same aggregation, but different facts
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2.6.2
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p.296
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9799
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3=2+1 presupposes collections of objects ('Threes'), which may be divided thus
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2.6.3
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p.297
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9801
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Numbers must be assumed to have identical units, as horses are equalised in 'horse-power'
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2.6.3
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p.297
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9800
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Arithmetic is based on definitions, and Sums of equals are equal, and Differences of equals are equal
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3.05.2
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p.132
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16845
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The whole theory of induction rests on causes
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3.05.3
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p.383
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14547
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The strict cause is the total positive and negative conditions which ensure the consequent
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3.05.6
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p.392
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14545
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A cause is an antecedent which invariably and unconditionally leads to a phenomenon
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3.06.6
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p.392
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12190
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Necessity is what will be, despite any alternative suppositions whatever
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3.07
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p.18
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16805
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Causal inference is by spotting either Agreements or Differences [Lipton]
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3.07/8
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p.99
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16835
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The Methods of Difference and of Agreement are forms of inference to the best explanation [Lipton]
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3.14.4-5
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p.126
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16843
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Mill's methods (Difference,Agreement,Residues,Concomitance,Hypothesis) don't nail induction [Lipton]
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3.24.5
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p.150
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9803
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We can't easily distinguish 102 horses from 103, but we could arrange them to make it obvious
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3.24.5
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p.150
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9802
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Numbers denote physical properties of physical phenomena
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3.24.5
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p.151
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9804
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Arithmetical results give a mode of formation of a given number
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3.24.5
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p.152
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9805
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12 is the cube of 1728 means pebbles can be aggregated a certain way
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3.24.5
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p.153
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9806
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Whatever is made up of parts is made up of parts of those parts
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3.4.1
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p.366
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9417
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What are the fewest propositions from which all natural uniformities could be inferred?
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3.5.2
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p.178
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8377
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Causation is just invariability of succession between every natural fact and a preceding fact
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4.1.2
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p.204
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16859
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Most perception is one-tenth observation and nine-tenths inference
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4.1.2
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p.204
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16860
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Inductive generalisation is more reliable than one of its instances; they can't all be wrong
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4.2.1
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p.195
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9078
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The study of the nature of Abstract Ideas does not belong to logic, but to a different science
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4.2.1
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p.196
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9079
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We can focus our minds on what is common to a whole class, neglecting other aspects
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4.2.1
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p.196
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9080
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General conceptions are a necessary preliminary to Induction
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4.2.2
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p.196
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9081
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We don't recognise comparisons by something in our minds; the concepts result from the comparisons
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4.2.5
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p.206
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9082
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Clear concepts result from good observation, extensive experience, and accurate memory
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Ch.4
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p.55
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9624
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Numbers are a very general property of objects [Brown,JR]
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p.217
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p.60
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4773
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Mill's regularity theory of causation is based on an effect preceded by a conjunction of causes [Psillos]
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p.245?
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p.95
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8741
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Numbers must be of something; they don't exist as abstractions
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p.255
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p.63
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4775
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In Mill's 'Method of Agreement' cause is the common factor in a range of different cases [Psillos]
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p.256
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p.64
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4776
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In Mill's 'Method of Difference' the cause is what stops the effect when it is removed [Psillos]
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p.32
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p.399
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10427
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All names are names of something, real or imaginary
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p.339 [1974 ed]
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p.89
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22623
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Necessity can only mean what must be, without conditions of any kind
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p.610?
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p.95
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8742
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The only axioms needed are for equality, addition, and successive numbers [Shapiro]
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p.119
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20515
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Maximise happiness by an area of strict privacy, and an area of utilitarian interventions [Wolff,J]
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p.124
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20516
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Mill defends freedom as increasing happiness, but maybe it is an intrinsic good [Wolff,J]
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p.125
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20517
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Utilitarianism values liberty, but guides us on which ones we should have or not have [Wolff,J]
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Ch.1
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p.129
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7210
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The will of the people is that of the largest or most active part of the people
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Ch.1
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p.135
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7212
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Individuals have sovereignty over their own bodies and minds
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Ch.1
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p.135
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7211
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Prevention of harm to others is the only justification for exercising power over people
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Ch.1
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p.136
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7214
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Ethics rests on utility, which is the permanent progressive interests of people
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Ch.1
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p.136
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7213
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Liberty arises at the point where people can freely and equally discuss things
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Ch.1
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p.138
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7215
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True freedom is pursuing our own good, while not impeding others
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Ch.2
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p.176
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7216
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The ethics of the Gospel has been supplemented by barbarous Old Testament values
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Ch.4
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p.214
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7217
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The main argument for freedom is that interference with it is usually misguided
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Ch.5
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p.225
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7220
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Restraint for its own sake is an evil
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Ch.5
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p.226
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7219
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Society can punish actions which it believes to be prejudicial to others
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Ch.5
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p.226
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7218
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Individuals are not accountable for actions which only concern themselves
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Ch.5
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p.229
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7221
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Blocking entry to an unsafe bridge does not infringe liberty, since no one wants unsafe bridges
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Ch.5
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p.230
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7222
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It is a crime for someone with a violent disposition to get drunk
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Ch.5
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p.232
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7223
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Pimping and running a gambling-house are on the border between toleration and restraint
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Ch.5
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p.239
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7224
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We need individual opinions and conduct, and State education is a means to prevent that
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Ch.5
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p.242
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7225
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It is a crime to create a being who lacks the ordinary chances of a desirable existence
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Ch.5
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p.243
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7226
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Benefits performed by individuals, not by government, help also to educate them
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Ch.5
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p.243
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7228
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Individuals often do things better than governments
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Ch.5
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p.244
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7227
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It is evil to give a government any more power than is necessary
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Ch.5
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p.246
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7229
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People who transact their own business will also have the initiative to control their government
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Ch.5
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p.248
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7230
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Aim for the maximum dissemination of power consistent with efficiency
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Ch.5
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p.249
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7231
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The worth of a State, in the long run, is the worth of the individuals composing it
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1861
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Representative Government
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p.97
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20508
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How people vote should be on public record, so they can be held accountable [Wolff,J]
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p.217-8
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p.93
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20504
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People can only participate in decisions in small communities, so representatives are needed
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p.232
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p.95
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20505
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Direct democracy is inexperience judging experience, and ignorance judging knowledge
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p.299
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p.97
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20507
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Voting is a strict duty, like jury service, and must only be aimed at the public good
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p.136
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6697
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Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims
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p.230
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7202
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The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche]
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Ch.1
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p.255
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3763
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Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good
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Ch.2
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p.145
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5935
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Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross]
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Ch.2
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p.257
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3764
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Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain
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Ch.2
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p.257
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3765
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Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends
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Ch.2
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p.260
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3766
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Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied
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Ch.2
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p.270
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3767
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Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action
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Ch.3
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p.279
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3768
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Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory
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Ch.3
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p.284
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3769
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With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience
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Ch.4
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p.288
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3770
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General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness
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Ch.4
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p.289
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3771
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Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end
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Ch.4
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p.294
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3772
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The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire
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Ch.5
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p.305
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3773
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No individual has the right to receive our benevolence
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Ch.5
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p.306
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3774
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Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence
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Ch.5
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p.309
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3775
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A right is a valid claim to society's protection
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Ch.5
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p.319
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3776
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Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness
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1865
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Examination of Sir Wm Hamilton's Philosophy
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p.107
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3583
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External objects are permanent possibilities of sensation
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p.243
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p.215
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3537
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I judge others' feeling by analogy with my body and behaviour
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p.43
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7076
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Mill wondered if he would be happy if all his aims were realised, and answered no [Critchley]
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1874
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Nature and Utility of Religion
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p.119
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21335
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Belief that an afterlife is required for justice is an admission that this life is very unjust
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p.115
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p.115
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21329
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Nature dispenses cruelty with no concern for either mercy or justice
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p.115
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p.115
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21328
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Killing is a human crime, but nature kills everyone, and often with great tortures
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p.116
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p.116
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21330
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Nature makes childbirth a miserable experience, often leading to the death of the mother
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p.116
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p.116
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21331
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Hurricanes, locusts, floods and blight can starve a million people to death
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p.116
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p.116
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21332
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We don't get a love of 'order' from nature - which is thoroughly chaotic
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p.117
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p.117
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21333
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Evil comes from good just as often as good comes from evil
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p.119
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p.119
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21334
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No necessity ties an omnipotent Creator, so he evidently wills human misery
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