| 1739 | Letters |
| 1754 | p.77 | 20705 | That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this |
| to Hutcheson 1739 | p.109 | 4579 | The idea of a final cause is very uncertain and unphilosophical |
| to Hutcheson 1739 | p.110 | 4580 | All virtues benefit either the public, or the individual who possesses them |
| to Hutcheson 1740 | p.110 | 4581 | Virtues and vices are like secondary qualities in perception, found in observers, not objects |
| 1739 | Treatise of Human Nature |
| p.-1 | 7446 | The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hacking] |
| p.11 | 20030 | If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Wilson/Schpall] |
| p.13 | 6182 | Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Kant] |
| p.14 | 6489 | Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H] |
| p.73 | 4008 | Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Taylor,C] |
| p.74 | 11098 | Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Quine] |
| p.77 | 3819 | Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle] |
| p.107 | 6692 | For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Graham] |
| p.146 | 19274 | Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke] |
| p.176 | 8067 | The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe] |
| p.186 | 8382 | For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Crane] |
| p.226 | 5548 | Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Kant] |
| p.232 | 6526 | Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Robinson,H] |
| I.I.6 | p.63 | 12048 | The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities |
| I.I.7 | p.67 | 7954 | If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences |
| I.II.2 | p.32 | 9428 | Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible |
| I.III.1 | p.119 | 8649 | Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another |
| I.III.16 | p.165 | 4766 | Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects |
| I.IV.2 | p.159 | 1207 | Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity |
| I.IV.2 | p.200 | 21290 | Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different |
| I.IV.2 | p.200 | 21289 | 'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity |
| I.IV.2 | p.200 | 21291 | There is no medium state between existence and non-existence |
| I.IV.2 | p.201 | 21292 | Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time |
| I.IV.2 | p.201 | 21293 | Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time |
| I.IV.3 | p.222 | 13424 | Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them |
| I.IV.4 | p.31 | 14301 | We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular |
| I.IV.6 | p.162 | 1317 | A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions |
| I.IV.6 | p.162 | 1316 | Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions |
| I.IV.6 | p.165 | 1321 | If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it |
| I.IV.6 | p.170 | 1330 | If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual |
| I.IV.6 | p.170 | 1388 | Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry] |
| I.IV.6 | p.170 | 1331 | The parts of a person are always linked together by causation |
| I.IV.6 | p.171 | 1333 | Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect |
| I.IV.6 | p.171 | 1332 | We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten |
| I.IV.6 | p.251 | 21294 | A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have |
| I.IV.6 | p.252 | 21295 | When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them |
| I.IV.6 | p.252 | 21297 | A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions |
| I.IV.6 | p.252 | 21296 | If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation |
| I.IV.6 | p.254 | 21298 | We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps |
| I.IV.6 | p.256 | 21299 | Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole |
| I.IV.6 | p.256 | 21300 | A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed |
| I.IV.6 | p.257 | 21301 | The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations |
| I.IV.6 | p.258 | 21302 | If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church |
| I.IV.6 | p.258 | 21303 | We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature |
| I.IV.6 | p.259 | 21304 | Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same |
| I.IV.6 | p.261 | 21306 | Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other |
| I.IV.6 | p.261 | 21305 | Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances |
| I.IV.6 | p.262 | 21307 | Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? |
| I.IV.7.3 | p.186 | 21806 | Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination |
| II.III.2 | p.70 | 22374 | You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character |
| II.III.3 | p.460 | 8257 | Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will |
| II.III.3 | p.462 | 3807 | Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions |
| II.III.ii | p.130 | 3650 | Total selfishness is not irrational |
| III.1.1 | p.521 | 4578 | You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction |
| III.I.2 | p.77 | 22382 | We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings |
| IV.1.4 | p.180 | 12417 | Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them |
| p.161 | p.114 | 11950 | We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them |
| p.168 | p.114 | 11949 | There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted |
| p.311 | p.99 | 11941 | The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous |
| p.313 | p.99 | 11942 | Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience |
| 1740 | Treatise of Human Nature, + Appendix |
| p.131 | 16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine] |
| p.135 | 15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead] |
| p.209 | 15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker] |
| Appen p.2 | p.624 | 20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes |
| Appendix | p.633 | 21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it |
| Appendix | p.634 | 21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? |
| Appendix | p.634 | 21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so |
| Appendix | p.635 | 21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? |
| Appendix | p.635 | 21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered |
| Bk 3 App. | p.115 | 5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer] |
| p.481 | p.192 | 23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships |
| 1741 | Nine political essays |
| p.75 | 6581 | Hume thought (unlike Locke) that property is a merely conventional relationship [Fogelin] |
| 1741 | Of the original contract |
| p.276 | p.276 | 21099 | People must have agreed to authority, because they are naturally equal, prior to education |
| p.278 | p.278 | 21100 | The idea that society rests on consent or promises undermines obedience |
| p.283 | p.43 | 20495 | We no more give 'tacit assent' to the state than a passenger carried on board a ship while asleep |
| p.283 | p.167 | 6703 | Poor people lack the knowledge or wealth to move to a different state |
| p.285 | p.285 | 21101 | The people would be amazed to learn that government arises from their consent |
| p.288 | p.288 | 21102 | We all know that the history of property is founded on injustices |
| p.291 | p.291 | 21103 | Moral questions can only be decided by common opinion |
| 1748 | Enquiry Conc Human Understanding |
| p.9 | 6350 | Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz] |
| p.63 | 15249 | Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden] |
| p.149 | 8344 | At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Davidson] |
| p.275 | 3661 | 'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Strawson,G] |
| p.276 | 8339 | Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Strawson,G] |
| p.342 | 3902 | Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton] |
| §82 | p.104 | 4636 | All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes) |
| 7.2.58 | p.74 | 13602 | We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning |
| 7.2.60 | p.77 | 8422 | Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed |
| I.VII.17 | p.125 | 17712 | General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular |
| II.12 | p.18 | 2182 | Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones |
| II.13 | p.19 | 2184 | All ideas are copies of impressions |
| II.13 | p.19 | 2183 | We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences |
| II.14 | p.19 | 2185 | The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds |
| II.15 | p.20 | 2186 | We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced |
| II.16 | p.21 | 23421 | If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in |
| II.17 | p.22 | 2187 | If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from |
| III.19 | p.24 | 2189 | All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect |
| IV.I | p.276 | 3662 | Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Strawson,G] |
| IV.I.20 | p.25 | 2191 | Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world |
| IV.I.20 | p.25 | 2190 | All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact |
| IV.I.22 | p.26 | 2192 | All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses |
| IV.I.23 | p.27 | 2194 | How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire? |
| IV.I.23 | p.27 | 2193 | No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions |
| IV.I.26 | p.30 | 2195 | We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes |
| IV.I.26 | p.31 | 2196 | The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy |
| IV.I.27 | p.31 | 2197 | Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application |
| IV.II.29 | p.33 | 2198 | We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread |
| IV.II.29 | p.212 | 3598 | Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M] |
| IV.II.30 | p.33 | 2199 | Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places |
| IV.II.30 | p.35 | 2200 | All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past |
| IV.II.31 | p.36 | 2702 | Only madmen dispute the authority of experience |
| IV.II.32 | p.38 | 2201 | Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this |
| IV.II.33 | p.39 | 2202 | Fools, children and animals all learn from experience |
| V.I.36 | p.43 | 2204 | All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning |
| V.I.36 | p.43 | 2203 | If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one |
| V.I.36 n.1 | p.45 | 2205 | You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience |
| V.I.37 | p.46 | 2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation |
| V.II.39 | p.48 | 2208 | Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects |
| V.II.39 | p.48 | 2207 | Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions |
| V.II.40 | p.49 | 2209 | Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination |
| V.II.41 | p.51 | 2210 | A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance |
| V.II.41 | p.231 | 8544 | Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker] |
| V.II.42 | p.52 | 2211 | When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly |
| V.II.43 | p.53 | 2212 | An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him |
| V.II.44 | p.54 | 2213 | Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation |
| V.II.45 | p.55 | 2214 | Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning |
| VI.46 | p.56 | 2215 | There is no such thing as chance |
| VI.47 | p.58 | 2216 | We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions |
| VII | p.214 | 8341 | Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Strawson,G] |
| VII.I.49 | p.62 | 2217 | When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise |
| VII.I.50 | p.63 | 2218 | In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities |
| VII.I.52 | p.66 | 2220 | Only experience teaches us about our wills |
| VII.II.60 | p.50 | 4771 | In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos] |
| VII.II.60 | p.74 | 5194 | Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer] |
| VII.II.60 | p.76 | 2221 | A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience |
| VIII.I.72 | p.94 | 2222 | The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions |
| VIII.I.73 | p.95 | 2223 | Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains |
| VIII.I.76 | p.98 | 2224 | Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition |
| VIII.I.76 | p.98 | 2225 | If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime |
| VIII.I.76 | p.99 | 2226 | Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind |
| VIII.II.75 | p.34 | 3655 | Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted] |
| X.i.89 | p.113 | 10328 | We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection |
| X.I.90 | p.114 | 2227 | A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored |
| X.I.90 | p.115 | 2228 | All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle' |
| X.I.91 | p.116 | 2229 | To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event |
| X.II.92 | p.116 | 2230 | Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [PG] |
| XI.105 | p.136 | 2232 | You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect |
| XI.114 | p.147 | 2233 | No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy |
| XI.115 | p.148 | 4772 | If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved |
| XI.115 | p.148 | 2234 | It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other |
| XII.I.116 | p.150 | 2235 | There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference |
| XII.I.117 | p.151 | 2237 | It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects |
| XII.I.117 | p.151 | 2236 | Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason |
| XII.I.121 | p.154 | 2238 | Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects |
| XII.I.122 | p.154 | 2239 | If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension |
| XII.II.122 | p.155 | 7700 | We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles |
| XII.II.124 | p.155 | 2240 | It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument |
| XII.II.128 | p.159 | 2241 | The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it |
| XII.III.129 | p.161 | 2242 | Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty |
| XII.III.130 | p.162 | 2243 | Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding |
| XII.III.132 | p.164 | 2245 | A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect |
| XII.III.132 | p.164 | 2244 | It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist |
| XII.III.132 | p.165 | 2246 | If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames |
| 1748 | Of Miracles |
| p. | 7636 | It can't be more rational to believe in natural laws than miracles if the laws are not rational [Ishaq] |
| 1750 | Of the First Principles of Government |
| p.25 | p.25 | 21094 | There are two kinds of right - to power, and to property |
| p.25 | p.25 | 21095 | It is an exaggeration to say that property is the foundation of all government |
| 1750 | Of Civil Liberty |
| p.54 | p.54 | 21097 | Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men |
| 1750 | Of the Origin of Government |
| p.28 | p.28 | 21096 | The only purpose of government is to administer justice, which brings security |
| 1750 | That Politics may be reduced to a Science |
| p.14 | p.14 | 21091 | It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good |
| p.15 | p.15 | 21092 | Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole |
| p.21 | p.21 | 21093 | Friendship without community spirit misses out on the main part of virtue |
| 1751 | Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals |
| I.136 | p.172 | 3918 | Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty |
| I.136 | p.172 | 3919 | Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act |
| I.III.145 | p.183 | 23560 | If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant |
| III.II.155 | p.194 | 3920 | If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again |
| III.II.157 | p.196 | 3921 | The safety of the people is the supreme law |
| III.II.163 | p.203 | 3922 | Justice only exists to support society |
| IX.I.217 | p.269 | 3925 | Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities |
| IX.I.222 | p.272 | 3926 | The human heart has a natural concern for public good |
| IX.II.228 | p.279 | 3928 | Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness |
| IX.II.228 | p.279 | 3927 | Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth |
| IX.II.228 | p.280 | 3929 | No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned |
| V.II.183 | p.226 | 3923 | No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing |
| V.II.186n | p.229 | 3924 | Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly |
| 1751 | Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion |
| Part 1 | p.45 | 6957 | The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds |
| Part 2 | p.53 | 6959 | We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes |
| Part 2 | p.54 | 6960 | Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind |
| Part 2 | p.54 | 6961 | An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ |
| Part 2 | p.59 | 6958 | How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? |
| Part 4 | p.72 | 6962 | The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order |
| Part 5 | p.76 | 6963 | Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? |
| Part 5 | p.77 | 6964 | From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty |
| Part 5 | p.77 | 6965 | The universe may be the result of trial-and-error |
| Part 5 | p.105 | 21279 | If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite |
| Part 5 | p.106 | 21281 | This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error |
| Part 5 | p.106 | 21280 | From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman |
| Part 5 | p.106 | 21282 | Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? |
| Part 5 | p.107 | 21283 | Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? |
| Part 5 | p.108 | 21284 | This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile |
| Part 7 | p.86 | 6966 | Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason |
| Part 7 | p.91 | 6967 | Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one |
| Part 8 | p.109 | 21285 | Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience |
| Part 8 | p.109 | 21286 | Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent |
| Part 8 | p.111 | 21287 | The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer |
| Part 8 | p.113 | 21288 | Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked |
| Part 9 | p.95 | 21254 | A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts |
| Part 9 | p.95 | 1435 | If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? |
| Part 9 | p.95 | 21255 | No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori |
| Part 9 | p.98 | 21256 | A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity |
| 1757 | Of the standard of taste |
| p.123 | 18552 | Forget about beauty; just concentrate on the virtues of delicacy and discernment admired in critics [Scruton] |
| p.159 | 6608 | Strong sense, delicate sentiment, practice, comparisons, and lack of prejudice, are all needed for good taste |
| 1775 | On suicide |
| p.170 | 4677 | If suicide is wrong because only God disposes of our lives, it must also be wrong to save lives |