1690 | Second Treatise of Government |
p.74 | 6580 | Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Fogelin] |
p.140 | 20520 | Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J] |
p.200 | 5654 | The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Scruton] |
003 | p.118 | 19863 | Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good |
004 | p.118 | 19864 | In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible |
004 | p.118 | 19865 | There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal |
006 | p.119 | 19866 | The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect |
008 | p.120 | 19867 | Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment |
009 | p.121 | 19868 | It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners |
012 | p.122 | 19869 | Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence |
017 | p.125 | 19870 | If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me |
022 | p.127 | 19871 | Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent |
026 | p.129 | 19872 | The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind |
027 | p.130 | 19873 | We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own |
027 | p.130 | 19875 | A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all |
027 | p.130 | 19874 | If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it |
028 | p.130 | 19876 | Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant |
029 | p.131 | 19877 | Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner |
031 | p.131 | 19878 | Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted |
032 | p.132 | 19879 | A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs |
040 | p.136 | 19880 | All value depends on the labour involved |
057 | p.143 | 19881 | The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible |
077 | p.154 | 19882 | We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs |
085 | p.158 | 19883 | Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society |
089 | p.160 | 19884 | There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights |
090 | p.160 | 19885 | Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society |
092 | p.162 | 19886 | The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history |
096 | p.165 | 19887 | Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority |
106 | p.169 | 19888 | A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it |
118 | p.177 | 19892 | Children are not born into citizenship of a state |
119 | p.166 | 6702 | If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws |
119 | p.177 | 19893 | Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it |
122 | p.179 | 19894 | You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise |
134 | p.183 | 19895 | Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws |
139 | p.188 | 19898 | Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money |
142 | p.189 | 19899 | The consent of the people is essential for any tax |
143 | p.190 | 19900 | The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws |
149 | p.192 | 19901 | The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust |
153 | p.211 | 19906 | All countries are in a mutual state of nature |
155 | p.196 | 19902 | Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people |
172 | p.205 | 19903 | Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract |
173 | p.206 | 19905 | People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism |
190 | p.214 | 19907 | There is a natural right to inheritance within a family |
196 | p.217 | 19908 | Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin |
205 | p.205 | 19904 | Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war |
211 | p.224 | 19909 | A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement |
212 | p.225 | 19910 | A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will |
222 | p.229 | 19911 | If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience |
236 | p.236 | 19912 | Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors |
237 | p.239 | 19913 | A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons |
1692 | Letters to William Molyneux |
1693.01.20 | p.179 | 12812 | Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive |
1694 | Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) |
p.1 | 16028 | Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Jones,J-E] |
p.5 | 16031 | Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Jones,J-E] |
p.6 | 15646 | If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Eagle] |
p.12 | 6487 | Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H] |
p.13 | 6488 | Locke has no patience with scepticism [Robinson,H] |
p.16 | 5827 | A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea |
p.18 | 16037 | Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Jones,J-E] |
p.37 | 5511 | For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Martin/Barresi] |
p.38 | 5512 | Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Martin/Barresi] |
p.48 | 6139 | Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks] |
p.51 | 6712 | For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Berkeley] |
p.60 | 5513 | Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant] |
p.62 | 8084 | Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery |
p.69 | 6725 | Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Berkeley] |
p.73 | 15966 | Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Alexander,P] |
p.102 | 1345 | Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler] |
p.121 | 15973 | In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Alexander,P] |
p.128 | 9438 | Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Mumford] |
p.141 | 2555 | For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Rorty] |
p.142 | 15982 | Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Alexander,P] |
p.152 | 15983 | Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Alexander,P] |
p.163 | 15986 | Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Alexander,P] |
p.167 | 7721 | Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination |
p.167 | 5175 | Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer] |
p.173 | 15989 | Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Alexander,P] |
p.199 | 12804 | There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Jolley] |
p.205 | 12810 | We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Jolley] |
p.213 | 2793 | It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Dancy,J] |
p.660 | 16787 | Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Pasnau] |
p.712 | 12306 | 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Copi] |
Epistle | p.10 | 7653 | I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge |
1 | p.113 | 7570 | Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Jolley] |
1.01.08 | p.47 | 6486 | Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think |
1.01.08 | p.92 | 15967 | The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences |
1.02.05 | p.50 | 12471 | Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them |
1.02.05 | p.50 | 2603 | If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate |
1.02.05 | p.50 | 12472 | If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate |
1.02.05 | p.50 | 7709 | A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it |
1.02.15 | p.55 | 7723 | The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet |
1.03.04 | p.68 | 12473 | We can demand a reason for any moral rule |
1.03.04 | p.68 | 4130 | There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason |
1.03.25? | p.169 | 4018 | Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible |
1.04.23 | p.101 | 10326 | Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true |
2.01.02 | p.104 | 7724 | All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience |
2.01.02 | p.104 | 7507 | The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas |
2.01.02 | p.106 | 12474 | The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write |
2.01.04 | p.105 | 12475 | All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection |
2.01.19 | p.115 | 5002 | Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind |
2.04.01 | p.123 | 16685 | An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it |
2.07.07 | p.131 | 12476 | Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity |
2.07.08 | p.131 | 12477 | We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies |
2.08.08 | p.135 | 12478 | A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds |
2.08.09 | p.135 | 12479 | Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number |
2.08.10 | p.135 | 15971 | Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us |
2.08.10-26 | p.6 | 16032 | To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Jones,J-E] |
2.08.15 | p.137 | 12480 | Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't |
2.08.15 | p.197 | 7049 | In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Heil] |
2.08.15 | p.199 | 7050 | I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Heil] |
2.08.21 | p.139 | 12481 | Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes |
2.09.08 | p.146 | 12482 | Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? |
2.09.09 | p.159 | 9083 | The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place |
2.11.10 | p.159 | 12483 | Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas |
2.13.10 | p.171 | 15980 | We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing |
2.13.14 | p.173 | 12484 | Motion is just change of distance between two things |
2.13.19 | p.175 | 12485 | We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does |
2.14.10 | p.185 | 12486 | An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea |
2.14.21 | p.190 | 12487 | We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal |
2.16.01 | p.205 | 12488 | The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea |
2.16.01 | p.205 | 7782 | Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it |
2.17.20 | p.222 | 12489 | If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous |
2.20.02 | p.229 | 4019 | Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain |
2.21.02 | p.234 | 12490 | Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions |
2.21.14 | p.240 | 12491 | Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square |
2.21.14 | p.240 | 12492 | Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills |
2.21.21 | p.244 | 12493 | A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences |
2.21.24 | p.246 | 12494 | Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing |
2.21.47 | p.263 | 3792 | We are free to decide not to follow our desires |
2.21.51 | p.266 | 12495 | Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature |
2.22.09 | p.292 | 12496 | Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas |
2.22.11 | p.294 | 12497 | Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action |
2.23.03 | p.296 | 7713 | We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence |
2.23.03 | p.296 | 12498 | Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence |
2.23.06 | p.298 | 7945 | We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support |
2.23.08 | p.300 | 8546 | Powers are part of our idea of substances |
2.23.08 | p.300 | 15979 | Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object |
2.23.12 | p.18 | 16038 | Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Jones,J-E] |
2.23.17 | p.306 | 12499 | Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion |
2.23.29 | p.175 | 16637 | The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind |
2.23.32 | p.314 | 12500 | Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling |
2.24.01 | p.328 | 12503 | Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time |
2.24.03 | p.318 | 12501 | The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse |
2.25.09 | p.323 | 12502 | Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection |
2.27 | p.721 | 16796 | Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Pasnau] |
2.27.01 | p.328 | 1211 | Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another |
2.27.01 | p.328 | 12505 | One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning |
2.27.01 | p.328 | 12504 | Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity |
2.27.02 | p.329 | 1197 | No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings |
2.27.02 | p.329 | 1196 | We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies |
2.27.03 | p.330 | 12506 | A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place |
2.27.03 | p.330 | 12508 | Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation |
2.27.03 | p.330 | 12507 | A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity |
2.27.06 | p.332 | 12509 | If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man |
2.27.07 | p.332 | 16795 | Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas |
2.27.07 | p.332 | 12510 | Not all identity is unity of substance |
2.27.09 | p.335 | 1202 | A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious |
2.27.09 | p.725 | 16797 | Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Pasnau] |
2.27.10 | p.115 | 1363 | Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid] |
2.27.10 | p.115 | 1364 | Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid] |
2.27.10 | p.117 | 1368 | Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid] |
2.27.10 | p.336 | 1373 | Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened |
2.27.10 | p.336 | 12511 | If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? |
2.27.10 | p.336 | 1372 | Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness |
2.27.13 | p.114 | 1361 | If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid] |
2.27.13 | p.338 | 1376 | Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable |
2.27.14 | p.115 | 21326 | Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid] |
2.27.14 | p.340 | 12512 | If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor |
2.27.15 | p.340 | 12513 | If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) |
2.27.17 | p.341 | 1378 | My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it |
2.27.19 | p.342 | 1380 | Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? |
2.27.20 | p.342 | 1381 | Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments |
2.27.22 | p.344 | 12514 | On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember |
2.27.25 | p.49 | 1397 | Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Noonan] |
2.27.25 | p.49 | 1387 | Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry] |
2.27.26 | p.346 | 1385 | 'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery |
2.27.26 | p.346 | 1386 | A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness |
2.28.10 | p.353 | 12515 | Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy |
2.29.03 | p.363 | 12516 | Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory |
2.29.07 | p.365 | 12517 | Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas |
2.31.02 | p.375 | 12518 | The mind cannot produce simple ideas |
2.31.06 | p.379 | 12519 | Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow |
2.31.06 | p.379 | 12520 | The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts |
2.31.08 | p.381 | 12521 | We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things |
2.31.13 | p.383 | 15988 | The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence |
2.32.01 | p.384 | 12522 | It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas |
2.32.05 | p.385 | 12523 | If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one |
2.32.12 | p.388 | 12524 | For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts |
2.32.15 | p.389 | 2421 | There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia |
2.32.15 | p.389 | 3522 | The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another |
2.32.24 | p.393 | 12525 | The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar |
2.33.04 | p.395 | 12526 | Opposition to reason is mad |
2.33.05 | p.395 | 12527 | Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom |
2.33.12 | p.398 | 12528 | If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room |
3.02.01-2 | p.405 | 7716 | Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas |
3.02.02 | p.405 | 7308 | Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them |
3.03 | p.712 | 12305 | Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Copi] |
3.03.01 | p.409 | 7717 | All things that exist are particulars |
3.03.06 | p.411 | 7040 | General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances |
3.03.11 | p.414 | 8910 | General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas |
3.03.13 | p.5 | 15644 | In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle] |
3.03.15 | p.417 | 11155 | Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is |
3.03.15 | p.417 | 12529 | I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' |
3.03.17 | p.418 | 12530 | The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing |
3.03.17 | p.418 | 15985 | It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties |
3.03.18 | p.418 | 13431 | A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties |
3.06.02 | p.4 | 16029 | Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Jones,J-E] |
3.06.02 | p.439 | 12531 | Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached |
3.06.02 | p.439 | 13771 | Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities |
3.06.04 | p.440 | 13434 | In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species |
3.06.04 | p.440 | 13433 | Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish |
3.06.04 | p.440 | 12809 | Nothing about me is essential |
3.06.05 | p.441 | 16786 | You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard |
3.06.06 | p.442 | 12532 | Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties |
3.06.06 | p.442 | 12533 | Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species |
3.06.08 | p.443 | 16035 | If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles |
3.06.09 | p.444 | 15976 | What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? |
3.06.09 | p.444 | 13435 | We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown |
3.06.11 | p.444 | 15170 | We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence |
3.06.12 | p.446 | 13436 | There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it |
3.06.19 | p.449 | 12534 | We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence |
3.06.25 | p.452 | 12535 | If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance |
3.06.26 | p.453 | 12536 | We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence |
3.06.28 | p.455 | 12537 | To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity |
3.06.32 | p.460 | 12539 | If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences |
3.06.32 | p.460 | 12538 | Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals |
3.06.39 | p.463 | 16036 | Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? |
3.06.41 | p.465 | 12540 | Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds |
3.08.01 | p.474 | 15974 | The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness |
3.08.2 | p.475 | 13423 | The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them |
3.09.02 | p.476 | 15991 | Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please |
3.10.15 | p.498 | 15978 | I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape |
3.10.20 | p.501 | 15992 | Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names |
3.11.16 | p.516 | 12541 | Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words |
4.01.02 | p.524 | 12542 | Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas |
4.02.01 | p.531 | 12543 | Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious |
4.02.01 | p.531 | 15995 | The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different |
4.03.06 | p.539 | 12544 | Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas |
4.03.06 | p.540 | 7840 | For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think |
4.03.06 | p.543 | 12545 | Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things |
4.03.12 | p.545 | 12546 | We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together |
4.03.13 | p.292 | 15996 | We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds |
4.03.14 | p.546 | 12547 | We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one |
4.03.16 | p.547 | 15984 | The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers |
4.03.16 | p.548 | 15950 | We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities |
4.03.18 | p.549 | 12548 | It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property |
4.03.20 | p.552 | 12549 | Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind |
4.03.25 | p.556 | 12550 | If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men |
4.03.27 | p.558 | 12551 | We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions |
4.03.28 | p.559 | 12552 | Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable |
4.03.28 | p.560 | 15997 | We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try |
4.03.29 | p.559 | 12553 | Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent |
4.03.29 | p.560 | 15993 | If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it |
4.03.31 | p.562 | 12554 | Existences can only be known by experience |
4.04.04 | p.564 | 17735 | Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances |
4.04.05 | p.564 | 12555 | The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge |
4.04.08 | p.566 | 10055 | Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist |
4.04.08 | p.566 | 12556 | Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant |
4.04.12 | p.568 | 12557 | Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world |
4.05.02 | p.574 | 12558 | Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions |
4.06.07 | p.582 | 12560 | We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary |
4.06.07 | p.582 | 12559 | Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum |
4.06.08 | p.583 | 12561 | For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence |
4.06.16 | p.591 | 12562 | General certainty is only found in ideas |
4.07.05 | p.594 | 12563 | Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place |
4.09.03 | p.618 | 12564 | I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt |
4.10.01 | p.619 | 12565 | God has given us no innate idea of himself |
4.10.03 | p.620 | 12566 | We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being |
4.10.10 | p.623 | 12567 | It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence |
4.11.03 | p.631 | 12568 | God assures me of the existence of external things |
4.11.03 | p.631 | 12569 | Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge |
4.13.03 | p.651 | 12570 | The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite |
4.16.12 | p.665 | 15977 | Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations |
4.16.13 | p.667 | 12571 | If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual |
4.17.04 | p.670 | 12572 | Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism |
4.17.21 | p.686 | 12573 | Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle |
4.17.24 | p.687 | 19517 | Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies |
4.20.16 | p.717 | 12574 | When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it |
III.3.11 | p.414 | 7718 | Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas |
1695 | Letters to Edward Stillingfleet |
Letter 1 | p.232 | 15990 | Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution |
Letter 2 | p.282 | 15994 | If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge |