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Ideas of Gottfried Leibniz, by Text

[German, 1646 - 1716, Born at Leipzig. Widely travelled. For a long time at the court of the Elector of Hanover. Died at Hanover.]

1669 Confessio naturae contra atheistas
A6.1.490 p.11 12693 A body is that which exists in space
1669 Elements of Law and Justice
p.2 p.2 19387 Hypotheses come from induction, which is comparison of experiences
1669 Letters to Thomasius
1669 p.24 13432 The essence of a circle is the equality of its radii
1669.04 p.30 12696 Bodies are recreated in motion, and don't exist in intervening instants
1671 Aristotle and Descartes on Matter
p.90 p.90 19399 Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest
1672 Notes on John Wilkins
A6.2.487-8 p.25 12694 Essence is the distinct thinkability of anything
1675 Letters to Foucher
p.4 2117 The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause
1676 p.222 13095 Essence is primitive force, or a law of change
1676 De arcanus motus
203 p.237 12733 Because of the definitions of cause, effect and power, cause and effect have the same power
203 p.238 12734 Every necessary proposition is demonstrable to someone who understands
1676 Meditatio de principio individui
A6.3.490 p.60 12702 Causes can be inferred from perfect knowledge of their effects
1676 Pacidius Philalethi dialogue
A6.3.565-6 p.45 12697 Indivisibles are not parts, but the extrema of parts
1676 Paper of December 1676
A6.3.400 p.196 12727 It's impossible, but imagine a body carrying on normally, but with no mind
1676 What is an Idea?
p.281 p.281 19423 By an 'idea' I mean not an actual thought, but the resources we can draw on to think
1677 Dialogue on Things and Words
p.7 p.7 19389 Truth is a characteristic of possible thoughts
p.7 p.7 19388 True and false seem to pertain to thoughts, yet unthought propositions seem to be true or false
1677 On Motion
A6.4.1968 p.110 12709 Motion is not absolute, but consists in relation
1677 Towards a Universal Characteristic
p.30 19370 'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Arthur,R]
p.17 p.17 19390 Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers
p.18 p.18 19391 We can assign a characteristic number to every single object
1678 Conspectus libelli (book outline)
A6.4.1398-9 p.55 12700 Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change
A6.4.1988 p.51 12699 A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul
A6.4.1998-9 p.246 12736 If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Garber]
A6.4.2010 p.50 12698 Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul
1678 De Natura Corporis
A6.4.1980 p.117 12710 As well as extension, bodies contain powers
1678 Definitiones cogitationesque metaphysicae
A6.4.1398 p.121 12712 Substance is that which can act
A6.4.1403 p.258 12737 Nature can be fully explained by final causes alone, or by efficient causes alone
1679 De aequopollentia causae et effectus
A6.4.1964 p.244 12735 Everything has a fixed power, as required by God, and by the possibility of reasoning
1679 Calculus Ratiocinator
A6.4.279 p.288 12742 A whole is just its parts, but there are no smallest parts, so only minds and perceptions exist
1679 Of Organum or Ars Magna of Thinking
p.1 p.1 5020 Our thoughts are either dependent, or self-evident. All thoughts seem to end in the self-evident
p.1 p.1 5019 Supreme human happiness is the greatest possible increase of his perfection
p.3 p.3 5021 An idea is analysed perfectly when it is shown a priori that it is possible
1679 Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia
C513-14 p.262 13099 Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers
p.7 p.7 5022 We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections
1679 Preface to Universal Characteristic
p.8 2118 All other human gifts can harm us, but not correct reasoning
1680 Precepts for Advancing Science and Arts
p.34 p.34 19392 I don't recommend universal doubt; we constantly seek reasons for things which are indubitable
1680 On Perceptions
A6.4.1398 p.280 12739 If we are dreaming, it is sufficient that the events are coherent, and obey laws
A6.4.1398 p.280 12738 Successful prediction shows proficiency in nature
1683 The Human Body is a sort of Machine
p.290 p.71 19376 A machine is best defined by its final cause, which explains the roles of the parts
1684 Reflections on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas
p.283 p.283 19425 In the schools the Four Causes are just lumped together in a very obscure way
p.283 p.283 19424 Knowledge needs clarity, distinctness, and adequacy, and it should be intuitive
p.284 p.284 19426 'Nominal' definitions just list distinguishing characteristics
p.287 p.287 19427 True ideas represent what is possible; false ideas represent contradictions
1685 De modo distinguendi phaenomena
A6.4.1502 p.282 12741 If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived
A6.4.1502 p.282 12740 The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction
A6.4.1504 p.155 12721 Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension
1686 De Mundo Praesenti
A6.4.1506 p.293 12743 A true being must (unlike a chain) have united parts, with a substantial form as its subject
A6.4.1507-8 p.124 12714 The substantial form is the principle of action or the primitive force of acting
1686 Discourse on Metaphysics
p.3 7558 Substances mirror God or the universe, each from its own viewpoint
§03 p.37 2119 People argue for God's free will, but it isn't needed if God acts in perfection following supreme reason
§13 p.23 5023 Future contingent events are certain, because God foresees them, but that doesn't make them necessary
§18 p.119 12711 The immediate cause of movements is more real [than geometry]
§27 p.37 5024 Knowledge doesn't just come from the senses; we know the self, substance, identity, being etc.
§33 p.42 5025 Mind and body can't influence one another, but God wouldn't intervene in the daily routine
§34 p.43 5026 Animals lack morality because they lack self-reflection
§34 p.44 5027 If a person's memories became totally those of the King of China, he would be the King of China
§8 p.18 13088 Subjects include predicates, so full understanding of subjects reveals all the predicates
§8 p.41 19349 The complete notion of a substance implies all of its predicates or attributes
§8 p.159 13085 Leibniz is some form of haecceitist [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
10 p.566 16761 Forms are of no value in physics, but are indispensable in metaphysics
5 p.39 19342 Reason avoids multiplying hypotheses or principles
1686 A Specimen of Discoveries
p.75 p.75 5035 The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason
p.78 p.78 5037 God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred
p.80 p.80 5038 Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them
1686 Identity in Substances and True Propositions
p.98 p.98 19405 Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves
1686 On Sufficient Reason
p.95 p.95 19404 Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason
p.95 p.95 19403 Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws
1686 Primary Truths
p.31 9155 An a priori proof is independent of experience
1686 Letters to Antoine Arnauld
14.07.1686 p.63 15955 I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena
1686.04.12 p.15 12903 Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together
1686.05 p.54 5031 Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe
1686.05 p.54 5030 Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design
1686.05.13 p.29 12904 If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me
1686.05.13 p.33 12905 I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself
1686.06 p.41 12906 Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists
1686.06 p.43 12907 Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world
1686.06 p.48 13077 Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions
1686.06 p.50 13089 To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events
1686.07.14 p.109 11981 If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual
1686.07.4/14 p.59 19334 I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard
1686.07.4/14 p.63 19333 A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject
1686.07.4/14 X p.55 12908 Essences exist in the divine understanding
1686.07.4/14 X p.57 12909 Everything, even miracles, belongs to order
1686.07.4/14 X p.58 12910 The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition
1686.07.4/14 X p.63 12911 Concepts are what unite a proposition
1686.07.4/14 X p.64 12912 Immortality without memory is useless
1686.07.4/14 X p.66 12913 Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics
1686.07.4/14 XI p.71 12914 Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason
1686.07.4/14 XI p.72 12915 Definitions can only be real if the item is possible
1686.11 p.88 12916 A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance
1686.11 p.89 12917 The soul is indestructible and always self-aware
1686.11 p.90 12918 Animals have souls, but lack consciousness
1686.11.28/12.8 p.94 12919 Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it
1686.12.08 p.65 5032 It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness
1687.04.30 p.34 12319 What is not truly one being is not truly a being either
1687.04.30 p.71 5033 Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations
1687.04.30 p.74 12704 Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance
1687.04.30 p.121 12920 There is no multiplicity without true units
1687.04.30 p.126 12921 Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism
1687.04.30 p.294 12745 Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances
1687.04.30 p.295 12746 We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity
1687.10.09 p.73 5034 Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths
1687.10.09 p.144 12922 A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship
1687.10.09 p.154 12923 Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul
1688.01.4/14 p.167 12924 Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject
1688.01.4/14 p.170 13079 A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth
1688.01.4/14 p.171 12925 Beauty increases with familiarity
1690.03.23 p.171 12927 Happiness is advancement towards perfection
1690.03.23 p.171 12926 Wisdom is the science of happiness
G II 121 p.88 12706 Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena
1686 True Method in Philosophy and Theology
p.64 p.64 19393 What is not active is nothing
1687 A General Principle to Explain Laws of Nature
p.67 p.67 19394 Inequality can be brought infinitely close to equality
p.69 p.69 19395 Philosophy is sanctified, because it flows from God
1688 On the Reality of Accidents
p.147 19382 Abstracta are abbreviated ways of talking; there are just substances, and truths about them
1689 On Freedom
p.106 p.106 5039 If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary
p.108 p.108 5040 Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable
p.109 p.109 5041 God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason
p.95 p.95 13159 Only God sees contingent truths a priori
1689 Letter on Freedom
p.112 p.112 5042 For every event it is possible for an omniscient being to give a reason for its occurrence
1689 On Copernicanism and Relativity of Motion
p.91 p.91 13157 Choose the true hypothesis, which is the most intelligible one
p.92 p.92 13158 The Copernican theory is right because it is the only one offering a good explanation
1689 Specimen inventorum
A6.4.1620 p.213 12729 The cause of a change is not the real influence, but whatever gives a reason for the change
1690 Exigency to Exist in Essences
p.91 p.91 19400 Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist
p.92 p.92 19401 God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities
p.92 p.92 19402 The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible
1690 Human Freedom and Divine choice
Grua 383 p.127 13083 The essence is the necessary properties, and the concept includes what is contingent
1690 Of liberty, Fate and God's grace
Grua 311 p.126 13082 The complete concept of an individual includes contingent properties, as well as necessary ones
1690 The Nature and Communication of Substance
p.120 p.120 2595 If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source
p.121 p.121 2596 Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks
1690 Notes on Comments by Fardella
Clarif p.105 13161 Substances are everywhere in matter, like points in a line
Prop 3 p.103 13160 To exist and be understood, a multitude must first be reduced to a unity
1690 Letters to Fardella
A6.4.1670 p.92 12708 The soul is not a substance but a substantial form, the first active faculty
1690 works
p.1 11878 Leibniz's view (that all properties are essential) is extreme essentialism, not its denial [Mackie,P]
p.5 9147 Number cannot be defined as addition of ones, since that needs the number; it is a single act of abstraction [Fine,K]
p.10 7560 Leibniz struggled to reconcile bodies with a reality of purely soul-like entities [Jolley]
p.21 8627 Leibniz is inclined to regard all truths as provable [Frege]
p.22 5509 Leibniz said dualism of mind and body is illusion, and there is only mind [Martin/Barresi]
p.22 7859 Leibniz had an unusual commitment to the causal completeness of physics [Papineau]
p.23 5510 Leibniz has a panpsychist view that physical points are spiritual [Martin/Barresi]
p.32 13467 Leibniz was the first modern to focus on sentence-sized units (where empiricists preferred word-size) [Hart,WD]
p.33 19332 For Leibniz, divine understanding grasps every conceivable possibility [Perkins]
p.39 19372 Concepts are ordered, and show eternal possibilities, deriving from God [Arthur,R]
p.42 7561 Substances are essentially active [Jolley]
p.45 10419 If relations can be reduced to, or supervene on, monadic properties of relata, they are not real [Swoyer]
p.56 16504 Two eggs can't be identical, because the same truths can't apply to both of them
p.59 12701 Leibniz moved from individuation by whole entity to individuation by substantial form [Garber]
p.64 7564 Occasionalism give a false view of natural laws, miracles, and substances [Jolley]
p.74 7565 Leibniz proposes monads, since there must be basic things, which are immaterial in order to have unity [Jolley]
p.76 8650 Things are the same if one can be substituted for the other without loss of truth
p.83 15883 Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Harré]
p.88 7568 Leibniz is an idealist insofar as the basic components of his universe are all mental [Jolley]
p.98 7569 Humans are moral, and capable of reward and punishment, because of memory and self-consciousness [Jolley]
p.109 11862 Leibniz was not an essentialist [Wiggins]
p.110 19354 Leibniz introduced the idea of degrees of consciousness, essential for his monads [Perkins]
p.113 4307 A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist
p.118 13080 Leibniz has a counterpart view of de re counterfactuals [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
p.120 19359 Leibniz aims to give coherent rational support for empiricism [Perkins]
p.122 12713 Forms have sensation and appetite, the latter being the ability to act on other bodies [Garber]
p.128 12715 Leibniz strengthened hylomorphism by connecting it to force in physics [Garber]
p.136 3346 For Leibniz rationality is based on non-contradiction and the principle of sufficient reason [Benardete,JA]
p.136 3347 Leibniz said the principle of sufficient reason is synthetic a priori, since its denial is not illogical [Benardete,JA]
p.150 19365 Limited awareness leads to bad choices, and unconscious awareness makes us choose the bad [Perkins]
p.154 18822 Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Rumfitt]
p.163 13086 Metaphysics is a science of the intelligible nature of being [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
p.169 13087 The essence of a thing is its real possibilities [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
p.171 3889 God's existence is either necessary or impossible [Scruton]
p.179 12725 Leibniz wanted to explain motion and its laws by the nature of body [Garber]
p.179 12035 Leibniz bases pure primitive entities on conjunctions of qualitative properties [Adams,RM]
p.195 7574 Natural law theory is found in Aquinas, in Leibniz, and at the Nuremberg trials [Jolley]
p.200 12728 Leibniz rejected atoms, because they must be elastic, and hence have parts [Garber]
p.217 13091 Leibnizian substances add concept, law, force, form and soul [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
p.226 13828 Necessary truths are those provable from identities by pure logic in finite steps [Hacking]
p.234 18080 A tangent is a line connecting two points on a curve that are infinitely close together
p.236 18081 Nature uses the infinite everywhere
p.238 7837 Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Stewart,M]
p.285 7841 We think we are free because the causes of the will are unknown; determinism is a false problem
p.286 13105 The laws-of-the-series plays a haecceitist role [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
p.293 7842 Leibniz was closer than Spinoza to atheism [Stewart,M]
p.317 16683 Leibniz eventually said resistance, rather than extension, was the essence of body [Pasnau]
p.371 16897 Reason is the faculty for grasping apriori necessary truths [Burge]
p.432 16710 Leibniz tried to combine mechanistic physics with scholastic metaphysics [Pasnau]
p.590 8110 Leibniz identified beauty with intellectual perfection [Gardner]
9.II p.168 15307 Leibniz uses 'force' to mean both activity and potential
A 6.3.326 p.220 13092 The essence of substance is the law of its changes, as in the series of numbers
A VI ii 241 p.58 19374 Microscopes and the continuum suggest that matter is endlessly divisible
A VI iii 555 p.68 19375 The continuum is not divided like sand, but folded like paper [Arthur,R]
G II:263 p.76 16507 The law within something fixes its persistence, and accords with general laws of nature
G II:264 p.85 16513 Identity of a substance is the law of its persistence
G II:517 p.85 13078 Relations aren't in any monad, so they are distributed, so they are not real
G VII:194 p.138 13084 How can things be incompatible, if all positive terms seem to be compatible?
1691 Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier
A1.6.226 p.154 12719 Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded
A1.6.226 p.154 12720 Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist
1693 On Wisdom
0 p.77 19396 Wisdom is knowing all of the sciences, and their application
1 p.79 19397 Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction
1693 Reply to Foucher
p.99 p.99 19406 I strongly believe in the actual infinite, which indicates the perfections of its author
1693 Letters to Jacques Lenfant
1693.11.25 p.171 12723 The most primitive thing in substances is force, which leads to their actions and dispositions
1694 De primae philosophiae emendatione
G IV 469 p.128 12716 The concept of forces or powers best reveals the true concept of substance
1695 Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil
p.113 p.113 13162 Sloth's Syllogism: either it can't happen, or it is inevitable without my effort
p.114 p.114 19339 Evil is a negation of good, which arises from non-being
p.114 p.114 13163 Circles must be bounded, so cannot be infinite
p.115 p.115 13164 God only made sin possible because a much greater good can be derived from it
1695 New system of communication of substances
p.139 p.139 13167 We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass
p.139 p.139 13169 I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity
p.139 p.139 13168 My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites
p.142 p.142 13170 The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action
p.144 p.144 13171 Substance must necessarily involve progress and change
1696 On the Principles of Indiscernibles
p.134 p.134 2116 The concept of an existing thing must contain more than the concept of a non-existing thing
1696 New System and Explanation of New System
p.116 p.116 5043 To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable
p.116 p.116 5044 Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points
p.120 p.120 5045 No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self
Reply 11 p.127 5046 The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another
1697 On the Ultimate Origination of Things
p.89 7696 Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Jacquette]
p.139 p.139 5047 The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity
p.150 p.150 19341 There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things
p.150 p.150 19343 We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost
p.151 p.151 19336 Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection
p.347 p.347 19428 Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence
p.347 p.347 19429 The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort
1697 A Résumé of Metaphysics
§11 p.146 5048 Perfection is simply quantity of reality
§18 p.146 5049 Intelligent pleasure is the perception of beauty, order and perfection
§23 p.147 5050 Evil serves a greater good, and pain is necessary for higher pleasure
1697 Letters to Bouvet
p.165 p.105 19407 We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts
1698 On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura)
§04 p.157 12755 Final causes can help with explanations in physics
§06 p.158 11854 If there is some trace of God in things, that would explain their natural force
§08 p.159 12756 Substance is a force for acting and being acted upon
§10 p.161 12758 It is plausible to think substances contain the same immanent force seen in our free will
§11 p.162 12759 There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension
§12 p.142 12718 Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete
§12 p.163 12760 Something rather like souls (though not intelligent) could be found everywhere
8 p.160 19408 To say that nature or the one universal substance is God is a pernicious doctrine
1698 Letter to the Editor about Bayle
§13 p.207 19348 All that is real in motion is the force or power which produces change
p.205 p.205 11945 In addition to laws, God must also create appropriate natures for things
1699 Letters to Johann Bernoulli
1698.11.18 p.168 13172 What we cannot imagine may still exist
1698.11.18 p.169 13173 Death is just the contraction of an animal
1698.12.17 p.169 13174 A piece of flint contains something resembling perceptions and appetites
1698.12.17 p.170 13175 Entelechies are analogous to souls, as other minds are analogous to our own minds
1702 On Body and Force, Against the Cartesians
p.252 p.252 13193 Active force is not just potential for action, since it involves a real effort or striving
p.252 p.252 13192 Power is passive force, which is mass, and active force, which is entelechy or form
p.253 p.253 13194 God's laws would be meaningless without internal powers for following them
p.255 p.255 13195 To explain a house we must describe its use, as well as its parts
p.256 p.256 13196 All qualities of bodies reduce to forces
1702 Reply to 'Rorarius' 2nd ed
GP iv 568 p.153 19384 Space and time are the order of all possibilities, and don't just relate to what is actual
1702 Letters to Pierre Bayle
1702 p.182 19413 If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted
1702 Letters to Queen Charlotte
1702 p.191 13189 A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence
1702 p.355 19430 We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving
1702 p.359 19431 There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander
1702 p.360 19432 Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences
p.189 p.189 23026 We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light
1702 Letters to Varignon
1702 p.187 19414 Men are related to animals, which are related to plants, then to fossils, and then to the apparently inert
1703 Letters to Thomas Burnett
1699 draft p.289 13198 Gravity is within matter because of its structure, and it can be explained.
1699.01.20/30 p.286 13197 The notion of substance is one of the keys to true philosophy
1704 New Essays on Human Understanding
Pref p.150 5053 The instances confirming a general truth are never enough to establish its necessity
Pref p.152 5054 Animal thought is a shadow of reasoning, connecting sequences of images by imagination
Pref p.158 5055 No two things are totally identical
Pref p.168 5057 If you fully understand a subject and its qualities, you see how the second derive from the first
Pref p.168 5056 Material or immaterial substances cannot be conceived without their essential activity
Pref p.170 5058 Animals have thought and sensation, and indestructible immaterial souls
Pref 65 p.65 11855 Substances cannot be bare, but have activity as their essence
Pref 66 p.66 11856 Qualities should be predictable from the nature of the subject
1.01 p.74 12929 All of our thoughts come from within the soul, and not from the senses
1.01 p.80 4302 You may experience a universal truth, but only reason can tell you that it is always true
1.01 p.80 17079 Proofs of necessity come from the understanding, where they have their source
1.01 p.81 12930 The senses are confused, and necessities come from distinct intellectual ideas
1.01 p.83 12931 Particular truths are just instances of general truths
1.01 p.86 12933 Arithmetic and geometry are implicitly innate, awaiting revelation
1.01 p.86 12932 The idea of being must come from our own existence
1.01.20 p.84 19360 General principles, even if unconscious, are indispensable for thinking
1.02 p.91 12934 We can't want everyone to have more than their share, so a further standard is needed
1.02 p.94 12935 Every feeling is the perception of a truth
1.02 p.96 12936 There are natural rewards and punishments, like illness after over-indulgence
1.02 p.101 12937 We shouldn't just accept Euclid's axioms, but try to demonstrate them
2.01 p.109 12939 Wholly uniform things like space and numbers are mere abstractions
2.01 p.109 12938 An idea is an independent inner object, which expresses the qualities of things
2.01 p.110 12941 There cannot be power without action; the power is a disposition to act
2.01 p.110 12940 What is left of the 'blank page' if you remove the ideas?
2.01 p.114 12943 Individuality is in the bond substance gives between past and future
2.01 p.114 12942 Memory doesn't make identity; a man who relearned everything would still be the same man
2.01 p.116 12944 It is a serious mistake to think that we are aware of all of our perceptions
2.01 p.119 12945 Thoughts correspond to sensations, but ideas are independent of thoughts
2.06 p.129 12946 The idea of the will includes the understanding
2.07 p.120 19357 The idea of green seems simple, but it must be compounded of the ideas of blue and yellow
2.07 p.129 12947 We only believe in sensible things when reason helps the senses
2.08 p.131 19358 Colour and pain must express the nature of their stimuli, without exact resemblance
2.08 p.132 12948 A pain doesn't resemble the movement of a pin, but it resembles the bodily movement pins cause
2.09 p.135 12949 Light takes time to reach us, so objects we see may now not exist
2.09 p.137 12950 We must distinguish images from exact defined ideas
2.11 p.142 12951 Abstraction attends to the general, not the particular, and involves universal truths
2.13 p.149 12952 Space is an order among actual and possible things
2.13 p.151 12953 Fluidity is basic, and we divide into bodies according to our needs
2.15 p.155 12955 If there were duration without change, we could never establish its length
2.15 p.155 12954 God's essence is the source of possibilities, and his will the source of existents
2.15 p.156 12956 Only whole numbers are multitudes of units
2.20 p.162 12957 The good is the virtuous, the pleasing, or the useful
2.20 p.163 12958 Love is pleasure in the perfection, well-being or happiness of its object
2.21 p.172 19364 Volition automatically endeavours to move towards what it sees as good (and away from bad)
2.21 p.172 12959 We discern active power from our minds, so mind must be involved in all active powers
2.21 p.173 12960 We understand things when they are distinct, and we can derive necessities from them
2.21 p.194 12962 Pleasure is a sense of perfection
2.21 p.199 19368 The will determines action, by what is seen as good, but it does not necessitate it
2.21 p.199 12963 Opposing reason is opposing truth, since reason is a chain of truths
2.21 p.201 12964 If would be absurd not to disagree with someone's taste if it was a taste for poisons
2.21 p.210 12965 All occurrence in the depth of a substance is spontaneous 'action'
2.21.13 p.179 19328 Without the principle of sufficient reason, God's existence could not be demonstrated
2.22 p.213 12966 Objects of ideas can be divided into abstract and concrete, and then further subdivided
2.22 p.216 12967 I use the word 'entelechy' for a power, to include endeavour, as well as mere aptitude
2.23 p.217 12968 A 'substratum' is just a metaphor for whatever supports several predicates
2.23 p.226 12969 The active powers which are not essential to the substance are the 'real qualities'
2.27 p.230 13098 We use things to distinguish places and times, not vice versa
2.27 p.230 12971 If two individuals could be indistinguishable, there could be no principle of individuation
2.27 p.230 13075 No two things are quite the same, so there must be an internal principle of distinction
2.27 p.230 12970 We can imagine two bodies interpenetrating, as two rays of light seem to
2.27 p.231 12972 Bodies, like Theseus's ship, are only the same in appearance, and never strictly the same
2.27 p.236 12973 We know our own identity by psychological continuity, even if there are some gaps
2.27.11 p.238 12884 The same whole ceases to exist if a part is lost
2.29 p.265 12974 People who can't apply names usually don't understand the thing to which it applies
2.31 p.267 12976 If our ideas of a thing are imperfect, the thing can have several unconnected definitions
2.31 p.267 12975 We have a distinct idea of gold, to define it, but not a perfect idea, to understand it
2.31 p.267 12977 We will only connect our various definitions of gold when we understand it more deeply
2.31 p.268 12978 A perfect idea of an object shows that the object is possible
3.03 p.289 12979 The only way we can determine individuals is by keeping hold of them
3.03 p.292 12980 Genus and differentia might be swapped, and 'rational animal' become 'animable rational'
3.03 p.293 12981 Essence is just the possibility of a thing
3.03 p.294 12983 A nominal definition is of the qualities, but the real definition is of the essential inner structure
3.03 p.294 12982 One essence can be expressed by several definitions
3.03 p.295 12984 Real definitions, unlike nominal definitions, display possibilities
3.04 p.297 12985 Maybe motion is definable as 'change of place'
3.05 p.302 12986 The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect
3.06 p.305 12987 For some sorts, a member of it is necessarily a member
3.06 p.307 12988 The universe contains everything possible for its perfect harmony
3.06 p.309 12989 Our true divisions of nature match reality, but are probably incomplete
3.08 p.333 12990 Real (non-logical) abstract terms are either essences or accidents
3.10 p.341 12991 Children learn language fast, with little instruction and few definitions
3.10 p.343 12993 Have five categories - substance, quantity, quality, action/passion, relation - and their combinations
3.10 p.343 12992 Logic teaches us how to order and connect our thoughts
3.10 p.345 12994 Gold has a real essence, unknown to us, which produces its properties
3.11 p.354 12995 The name 'gold' means what we know of gold, and also further facts about it which only others know
3.3 p.289 12811 We can't know individuals, or determine their exact individuality
4.02 p.367 12996 I know more than I think, since I know I think A then B then C
4.02 p.369 12997 Analysis is the art of finding the middle term
4.02 p.375 12998 Understanding grasps the agreements and disagreements of ideas
4.03 p.379 12999 Substances are primary powers; their ways of being are the derivative powers
4.05 p.398 13000 Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about
4.06 p.403 13001 Our sensation of green is a confused idea, like objects blurred by movement
4.06 p.407 13002 It is always good to reduce the number of axioms
4.07 p.411 13003 The Cogito doesn't prove existence, because 'I am thinking' already includes 'I am'
4.11 p.444 13005 Truth arises among sensations from grounding reasons and from regularities
4.11 p.445 13006 Certainty is where practical doubt is insane, or at least blameworthy
4.11.14 p.110 10056 At bottom eternal truths are all conditional
4.12 p.452 13008 Geometry, unlike sensation, lets us glimpse eternal truths and their necessity
4.17 p.475 13009 A reason is a known truth which leads to assent to some further truth
6.6.292 p.199 12805 If two people apply a single term to different resemblances, they refer to two different things
6.6.311 p.200 12806 Locke needs many instances to show a natural kind, but why not a single instance? [Jolley]
6.6.345 p.201 12808 Part of our idea of gold is its real essence, which is not known to us in detail
6.6.354 p.201 12807 The word 'gold' means a hidden constitution known to experts, and not just its appearances
App X p.37 1414 A perfection is a simple quality, which is positive and absolute, and has no limit
App X p.38 21252 Perfections must have overlapping parts if their incompatibility is to be proved
App X p.39 21253 Descartes needs to demonstrate how other people can attain his clear and distinct conceptions
1705 On Note L to Bayle's 'Rorarius'
[C] p.235 19350 We should say that body is mechanism and soul is immaterial, asserting their independence
[L] p.238 19356 Minds unconsciously count vibration beats in music, and enjoy it when they coincide
[L] p.238 19355 The soul doesn't understand many of its own actions, if perceptions are confused and desires buried
1705 Principle of Life and Plastic Natures
p.190 p.190 19416 Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated
p.192 p.192 19417 All substances are in harmony, even though separate, so they must have one divine cause
p.194 p.194 19418 Mechanics shows that all motion originates in other motion, so there is a Prime Mover
p.195 p.195 19420 Death and generation are just transformations of an animal, augmented or diminished
p.195 p.195 19419 Not all of perception is accompanied by consciousness
p.198 p.198 19421 Souls act as if there were no bodies, and bodies act as if there were no souls
p.198 p.198 19422 Every particle of matter contains organic bodies
1706 Letters to Burcher De Volder
1699 p.223 13096 The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change
1699.03.24 p.173 13177 An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity
1699.03.24/04.03 p.161 19409 Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes
1699.03.24/04.03 p.162 19410 Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena
1699.06.23 p.154 11873 Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things
1703.06.20 p.175 13178 Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations
1703.06.20 p.176 13179 A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power
1703.06.20 p.178 13180 Space is the order of coexisting possibles
1703.06.20 p.178 13181 Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities
1703.06.20 p.180 19411 In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike
1703.06.20 p.180 19412 If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter
1703.06.20 p.312 12747 Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension
1704 p.96 19379 The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it
1704 p.220 13093 The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity
1704 or 1705 p.181 13183 Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws
1704 or 1705 p.182 13184 The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances
1704 or 1705 p.183 13186 Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances
1704 or 1705 p.183 13185 Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws
1704.01.21 p.312 12748 Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them
1704.06.30 p.180 13182 Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences
1704.06.30 p.363 12752 Only unities have any reality
1705.01 p.314 12749 Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances
1706.01.19 p.185 13187 In actual things nothing is indefinite
1706.01.19 p.186 13188 The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities
G II 170 p.164 12722 Thought terminates in force, rather than extension
GP ii 240 p.148 19383 A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him
1707 Letters to Coste
1707 p.483 19433 The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen
1707 p.484 19434 There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues
1710 The Theodicy
Abridge III p.514 19437 Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan
p.098 p.42 19337 How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice?
p.120 p.54 19345 Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world
p.127 p.20 19325 God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity
p.127 p.21 19326 God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities
p.128 p.21 19327 The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities
p.130 p.59 19346 Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety
p.136 p.31 19331 Will is an inclination to pursue something good
p.136 p.45 19340 Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin
p.151 p.156 19367 Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress
p.159 p.102 19351 Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body
p.189 p.51 19344 God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man
p.192 p.37 19335 Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours
p.237 p.28 19330 If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God
p.332 p.24 19329 The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being
p.426 p.155 19366 You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them
1710 Letters to Wagner
1710 §2 p.504 19436 Bare or primary matter is passive; it is clothed or secondary matter which contains action
1712 Geometrical Method and Metaphysics
p.89 p.89 19398 Minds are best explained by their ends, and bodies by efficient causes
1712 Metaphysical conseqs of principle of reason
§5 p.174 5059 Power rules in efficient causes, but wisdom rules in connecting them to final causes
§7 p.175 5060 All substances analyse down to simple substances, which are souls, or 'monads'
1712 Letters to Lelong
1712 p.254 13097 Force in substance makes state follow state, and ensures the very existence of substance
1714 Principles of Nature and Grace based on Reason
§17 p.203 5063 Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers
§4 p.208 19353 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception
§5 p.197 5061 Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes
§7 p.199 5062 First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this?
4 p.208 19377 A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees
1715 Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics
p.201 p.201 22908 When one element contains the grounds of the other, the first one is prior in time
1715 Letters to Des Bosses
1712.02.05 p.198 12774 Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams
1712.02.05 p.199 12775 Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection
1712.02.05 p.200 12776 Every substance is alive
1712.05.26 p.201 12777 Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them
1716.01.13 p.379 12753 A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads
1716.05.29 p.202 12779 There is a reason why not every possible thing exists
1716.05.29 p.202 12778 There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite
1716.05.29 p.202 12780 We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori
1716.05.29 p.203 12781 A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts
1716.05.29 p.204 12782 Monads control nothing outside of themselves
1716.05.29 p.205 12783 Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality
1716.05.29 p.205 12784 Allow no more miracles than are necessary
1716.05.29 p.206 12785 Truth is mutually agreed perception
1715 Letters to Remond de Montmort
1715 p.189 19415 Passions reside in confused perceptions
1715 §2 p.554 19438 Our large perceptions and appetites are made up tiny unconscious fragments
1715 §8 p.557 19439 God produces possibilities, and thus ideas
1715.06.22/G III 645 p.236 12732 Some necessary truths are brute, and others derive from final causes
1715 Letters to Wolff
1715.05.18 p.233 13191 The properties of a thing flow from its essence
1716 Against Barbaric physics
A&G:313 p.426 16709 Some people return to scholastic mysterious qualities, disguising them as 'forces'
1716 Monadology
p.3 7644 The monad idea incomprehensibly spiritualises matter, instead of materialising soul [La Mettrie]
p.83 7931 If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Macdonald,C]
p.85 11857 He replaced Aristotelian continuants with monads [Wiggins]
p.308 7843 Is a drop of urine really an infinity of thinking monads? [Voltaire]
p.355 12751 It is unclear in 'Monadology' how extended bodies relate to mind-like monads. [Garber]
(opening) p.88 12707 The true elements are atomic monads
§09 p.214 17554 There must be some internal difference between any two beings in nature
§11-12 p.214 19363 Changes in a monad come from an internal principle, and the diversity within its substance
§17 p.181 2109 Increase a conscious machine to the size of a mill - you still won't see perceptions in it
§19 p.150 19352 A 'monad' has basic perception and appetite; a 'soul' has distinct perception and memory
§28 p.183 2110 We all expect the sun to rise tomorrow by experience, but astronomers expect it by reason
§30 p.217 19362 We know the 'I' and its contents by abstraction from awareness of necessary truths
§31 p.184 2111 Falsehood involves a contradiction, and truth is contradictory of falsehood
§32 p.184 4642 No fact can be real and no proposition true unless there is a Sufficient Reason (even if we can't know it)
§33 p.184 2112 Truths of reason are known by analysis, and are necessary; facts are contingent, and their opposites possible
§35 p.153 9344 Mathematical analysis ends in primitive principles, which cannot be and need not be demonstrated
§45 p.186 2113 God alone (the Necessary Being) has the privilege that He must exist if He is possible
§58 p.188 2114 This is the most perfect possible universe, in its combination of variety with order
§61 p.189 2115 Everything in the universe is interconnected, so potentially a mind could know everything
1716 Letters to Samuel Clarke
p.57 22894 If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Bardon]
§2 p.207 2099 The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason
§2 p.207 2098 The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics
3.2 p.211 3646 There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise
3.4 p.210 2100 Space and time are purely relative
3.6 p.212 2101 If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference
4.04 p.216 2102 Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable
4.14 p.217 2103 The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy
4.21 p.218 2104 No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit
4.PS p.220 2105 Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible
5.24 p.225 2106 The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension
5.49 p.233 2107 No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist
5th paper p.235 20965 Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Papineau]
5th Paper, §47 p.315 21346 The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both
V §91 p.162 19385 All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe
1716 Letters to Samuel Masson
1716 p.229 13190 I don't admit infinite numbers, and consider infinitesimals to be useful fictions