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Ideas of John Duns Scotus, by Text

[Scottish, 1266 - 1308, Born at Duns, Scotland. Taught at the University of Paris. Known as 'Doctor Subtilis'.]

1298 Lectura
I.17.2.4 p.208 'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity
1300 In Praed.
15.1 p.607 Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things
1301 Oxford Commentary on Sentences
II.12.1.14 p.101 Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens'
1301 works
p.205 The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Dumont]
p.205 Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Dumont]
p.206 Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Dumont]
p.206 Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Dumont]
p.206 Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Dumont]
p.206 Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Dumont]
p.206 Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Dumont]
p.206 Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Dumont]
p.206 The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Dumont]
p.206 The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Dumont]
p.206 We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Dumont]
1302 Ordinatio
p.53 If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Panaccio]
p.53 If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Panaccio]
p.222 The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
II d3 p1 q2 n48 p. What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone?
III.2.2 p.591 It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate
IV.11.3 p.139 We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not
IV.11.3 p.582 Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other
IV.12.1 p.196 Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought
1304 In Metaphysics
III n. 116 p.125 Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being'
V.5-6 n91 p.241 Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Pasnau]