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Ideas of Thomas Aquinas, by Text

[Italian, 1225 - 1274, Born Roccasecca, Italy. Dominican monk. Taught by Albertus Magnus. Based Paris, then Italy. Died at Fossanova. 'Doctor Angelicus'.]

1264 Sentences
IV.13.2.3sc p.433 16711 Heretics should be eradicated like wolves
1265 Summa Theologicae
p.20 5508 Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Martin/Barresi]
p.39 22106 Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Kretzmann/Stump]
p.39 22107 Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Kretzmann/Stump]
p.42 22111 Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Kretzmann/Stump]
p.117 8009 Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [MacIntyre]
p.198 20211 Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Zagzebski]
p.573 5614 If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant]
Art 1, Obj 3 p.31 21248 If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true!
Art 1, Obj 3 p.32 21249 Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves
Art 1, Obj 3 p.32 21250 A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject
Art 1, Obj 3 p.32 21251 We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us
Ch.5 Q85.1 p.133 9094 Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance
Ch.5 Q85.1 p.133 9092 Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied
Ch.5 Q85.1 p.133 9093 We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities
Ch.5 Q85.1 p.134 9097 The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding
Ch.5 Q85.1 p.134 9095 Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general
Ch.5 Q85.1 p.134 9096 The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species
Ch.5 Q85.2 p.135 9098 Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present
Ch.5 Q85.2 p.136 9099 Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them
I Q11 ar2 ad4 p.36 15812 Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude
I, q75, a3, resp p.329 23306 Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Sorabji]
Ia 2ae Q61 a.3 p.9 22399 Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason
Ia IIae.Q18.5c p.43 22112 For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason
Ia IIae.Q92.1, ad 4 p.44 22114 Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws
Ia IIae.Q94.2c p.44 22113 Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason
Ia Q18.2c p.324 16687 Bodies are three-dimensional substances
Ia Q76 4c p.575 16765 Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them
Ia,q.Q14,art 1 p. 21337 A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known
Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob1 p.82 21266 God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable
Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob1rep p.85 21274 It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil
Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob2 p.82 21268 Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed
Ia,Q02,Art3,Ob2 p.82 21267 Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it
Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply p.83 21269 Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover
Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply p.84 21271 Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being
Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply p.84 21270 Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause
Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply p.85 21272 Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections
Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply p.85 21273 Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director
Ia.Q75 2c p.39 22105 The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle
Ia.Q85 5c p.40 22108 First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division
II p.211 7291 For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Grayling]
I-II Q19 6 p.9 23173 If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow
I-II Q56 a5 obj3 p.277 20224 Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason
I-II Q91 2 p.20 23174 Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law
I-II Q94 4 p.51 23175 The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain
I-II Q94 4 p.51 23176 Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not
III Supp Q94,1 p.49 4412 Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished
II-I.Q132 p.54 22494 We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it
II-II Q57 1 p.137 23177 Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality
II-II Q57 2 p.140 23178 Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded
II-II Q57 4 p.142 23179 People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each
II-II Q58 4 p.150 23180 The will is the rational appetite
II-II Q58 5 p.152 23181 All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good
II-II Q58 6 p.154 23182 Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good
Q110 p.239 20621 Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Tuckness/Wolf]
Q85 1 Ad 1 p.159 10505 We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature
Q85 1 Ad 1 p.159 10504 Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately
Q85 1 Reply p.158 10503 We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things
Q85 Ad2 p.160 10507 Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities
Q85 Ad2 p.160 10506 Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter
Q85 Ad4 p.161 10508 Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions
Q85 Art2 p.162 10509 Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species
1266 On Aristotle's 'Metaphysics'
V.9.890 p.230 16655 Different genera are delimited by modes of predication, which rest on modes of being
1267 De Ente et Essentia (Being and Essence)
p.196 13090 The principle of diversity for corporeal substances is their matter [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
23 p.17 13070 If definitions must be general, and general terms can't individuate, then Socrates can't be defined [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
p.100 p.100 11205 If the form of 'human' contains 'many', Socrates isn't human; if it contains 'one', Socrates is Plato
p.102 p.102 11206 The mind constructs complete attributions, based on the unified elements of the real world
p.103 p.103 11207 A cause can exist without its effect, but the effect cannot exist without its cause
p.103 p.103 11208 A simple substance is its own essence
p.92 p.92 11195 If affirmative propositions express being, we affirm about what is absent
p.92 p.92 11197 The definitions expressing identity are used to sort things
p.92 p.92 11196 Essence is something in common between the natures which sort things into categories
p.92 p.92 11198 Definition of essence makes things understandable
p.93 p.93 11200 The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form
p.93 p.93 11201 Properties have an incomplete essence, with definitions referring to their subject
p.94 p.94 11202 It is by having essence that things exist
p.95 p.95 11203 Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form
1267 Disputed questions about truth
I.1c p.37 22103 Being is basic to thought, and all other concepts are additions to being
I.1c p.37 22104 Truth is the conformity of being to intellect
1267 Quodlibeta
8.2.1 p.8 22168 Minds take in a likeness of things, which activates an awaiting potential
8.2.2 p.19 22169 Initial universal truths are present within us as potential, to be drawn out by reason
8.2.2 p.20 22170 Senses grasp external properties, but the understanding grasps the essential natures of things
IX.2.2 p.184 16641 Whiteness does not exist, but by it something can exist-as-white
1268 Summa Contra Gentiles
I.1.6 p.45 22115 Wise people should contemplate and discuss the truth, and fight against falsehood
I.66 p.27 15202 Eternity coexists with passing time, as the centre of a circle coexists with its circumference
III.67 p.42 20700 Without God's influence every operation would stop, so God causes everything
1268 Sententia on 'De Caelo'
I.22.228 p.35 22101 Philosophy aims to know the truth about the way things are
1268 On the spiritual perfection of life
26 p.35 22102 Arguing with opponents uncovers truths, and restrains falsehoods
1269 Sententia on 'Posterior Analytics'
1.2.9, 1.5.7 p.41 22109 The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory [Kretzmann/Stump]
1269 Quaestiones de Potentia Dei
q3 a16 ad 3-um p. 17555 'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number
1269 Quaestiones de anima
11c p.578 16766 One thing needs a single thing to unite it; if there were two forms, something must unite them
1271 Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo
Q6.06 p.172 1846 The will can only want what it thinks is good
Q6.07 p.173 1847 The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means
Q6.10 p.173 1848 We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence
Q6.h to 05 p.181 1856 Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable
Q6.h to 07 p.181 1857 We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it
Q6.h to 12 p.182 1858 The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths
Q6.h to 15 p.182 1859 Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process
Q6.h to 18 p.182 1860 Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge
Q6.h to 21 p.183 1861 The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it
Q6.h to 24 p.183 1862 However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit
Q6.reply p.176 1850 Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming
Q6.reply p.177 1851 Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind
Q6.reply p.177 1852 For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many
Q6.reply p.178 1853 Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will
Q6.reply p.178 1854 We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will
Q6.reply p.179 1855 If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it
Q6.x2 p.175 1849 Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them
1272 Super Epistolam Pauli Apostoli
p.192 1863 If the soul achieves well-being in another life, it doesn't follow that I do