| 250 | Lives of Eminent Philosophers |
| 3.1.23 | p.132 | 3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents |
| Full Idea: Induction is an argument which by means of some admitted truths establishes naturally other truths which resemble them; there are two kinds, one proceeding from contraries, the other from consequents. | |||
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.23) |
| 3.1.52 | p.143 | 3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers |
| Full Idea: Dialectic is when men converse by putting short questions and giving brief answers to those who question them. | |||
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 3.1.52) |
| 6.Men.3 | p.258 | 1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods |
| Full Idea: Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods. | |||
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 6.Men.3) |
| 9.11.11 | p.418 | 3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic |
| Full Idea: When sceptics say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they here give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. | |||
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.11.11) |
| 9.Py.11 | p.413 | 1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things |
| Full Idea: Sceptics say that every demonstration depends on things which demonstrates themselves, or on things which can't be demonstrated. | |||
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) | |||
| A reaction: This refers to two parts of Agrippa's Trilemma (the third being that demonstration could go on forever). He makes the first option sound very rationalist, rather than experiential. |
| 9.Py.11 | p.418 | 1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument |
| Full Idea: Sceptics actually assert two dogmas: that nothing should be defined, and that every argument has an opposite argument. | |||
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 9.Py.11) |
| 10.28 | p.473 | 1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition |
| Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition. | |||
| From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28) | |||
| A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus. |