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Single Idea 24332

[catalogued under 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions]

Full Idea

If we cannot refer our actions back to any starting-points beyond the ones in us, then, since they are indeed things that have their starting-points in us, they themselves are also up to us and voluntary.

Gist of Idea

We can't refer our actions back beyond starting-points in us, so we control them

Source

Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1113b19)

A Reaction

In Idea 24326 it seems that it is deliberative choice, rather than voluntariness, which determines responsibility. The voluntariness (?) described above is necessary for responsibility, but not sufficient.

Book Reference

Aristotle: 'Nicomachean Ethics', ed/tr. Reeve, C.D.C. [Hackett 2024], p.43

Related Idea

Idea 24326 Deliberate choice is voluntary, but the voluntary also covers children and animals [Aristotle]