The 41 new ideas included in the latest update (of 23rd Dec), by Theme

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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophers can employ different abstraction to those used in science [Chirimuuta]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Methodology can't skew results if multiple evidence converges [Lakoff/Johnson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Abstract reasoning is rooted in the sensorimotor inferences of the body [Lakoff/Johnson]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Dupré sees all organisms as processes, not entities [Dupré, by Chirimuuta]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We mostly categorise by engagement with the world [Lakoff/Johnson]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 4. Category Realism
The traditional view is that nature has a unique category structure [Lakoff/Johnson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
Theories seem intuitive because they are based on metaphors embedded in a culture [Lakoff/Johnson]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Science consists entirely of conceptually moulding nature to suit human purposes [Chirimuuta]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
For empiricists, machines with huge data could become better scientists than humans [Chirimuuta]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 7. Scientific Models
Idealised modelling is better seen as mathematised simplification [Chirimuuta]
Perspectival pluralism says varied simplifications produce diverse descriptions of things [Chirimuuta]
With big data, models no longer extrapolate from a sample, but mould onto the given data [Chirimuuta]
To build theories and models, individuality must be blurred out in categorisation [Chirimuuta]
In science we cannoy distinguish the contribution of the knower from what is known [Chirimuuta]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
The more detailed a causal explanation is, the less it can be generalised [Chirimuuta]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Reduction gets stuck when the isolated individuals can't explain the collective [Chirimuuta]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
The brain has 170 billion cells, with more in spine and intestines [Chirimuuta]
Each brain synapse contains around 2,500 types of protein [Chirimuuta]
Seeing brains as infinitely complex makes more sense than seeing them as simple [Chirimuuta]
Brain research should reject sharp boundaries, excessive simplification, and neglect of animals [Chirimuuta]
Brains largely retain the same set of neurons throughout life [Chirimuuta]
The brain is endlessly complex, and hence is not knowable by us [Chirimuuta]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Conceptual metaphors project our basic experience, and thus create abstract reasoning [Lakoff/Johnson]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
We can't know our own minds, because most thought is unconscious [Lakoff/Johnson]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
The Subject is the focus of living, and the Selves are related images [Lakoff/Johnson]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Traditionally, free will is implied by dualism, and needs reason to be fully conscious [Lakoff/Johnson]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
Computationalism separates function from background, neglecting the latter's complexity [Chirimuuta]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
If mental life is seen as 'emergent' from the brain, why not emergent from the whole organism? [Chirimuuta]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Most human thought is non-conscious [Lakoff/Johnson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
We are largely unaware of how we reason [Lakoff/Johnson]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
If the mind is radically free it is beyond both causal laws and scientific study [Lakoff/Johnson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Our conceptual systems are mostly unconscious, and thus hard to change [Lakoff/Johnson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
All of our concepts arise from our bodily perceptual and motor systems [Lakoff/Johnson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
Conceptual metaphors connect the inferential structures of two domains [Lakoff/Johnson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Sentence meaning determines its truth-value in various situations [Lewis]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
Metaphors project inference patterns, so much reasoning is metaphorical [Lakoff/Johnson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Moral systems are based on various models of family life [Lakoff/Johnson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue is the moral strength to fulfil duty, and arises from reason [Kant]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
'Process theory' says a causal event must trnsmit some kind of 'mark' [Salmon, by Chirimuuta]
X is causally linked to Y if interventions on X, even if remote, affect Y [Woodward,J, by Chirimuuta]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
The general theory of energy started with steam engines, followed by Carnot's theory of them [Chirimuuta]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
Our sense of time may arise from regular brain pulses [Lakoff/Johnson]