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9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

[distinct objects with uncertain boundaries]

29 ideas
A mixed drink separates if it is not stirred [Heraclitus]
The essence of baldness is vague and imperfect [Leibniz]
All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce]
Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce]
The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege]
Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege]
If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
Is the Pope's crown one crown, if it is made of many crowns? [Wiggins]
Boundaries are not crucial to mountains, so they are determinate without a determinate extent [Wiggins]
We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis]
Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury]
If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury]
Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury]
We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K]
Vagueness can be in predicates, names or quantifiers [Fine,K]
A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro]
Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson]
Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson]
Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley]
Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley]
An offer of 'free coffee or juice' could slowly shift from exclusive 'or' to inclusive 'or' [Sorensen]
Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt]
The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt]
Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt]