| 1564 | True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)] |
| 19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
| 4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
| 12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
| 19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
| 23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
| 8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
| 23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
| 6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
| 6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
| 6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
| 9921 | 'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen] |
| 4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
| 4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
| 14419 | Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks] |
| 12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
| 15325 | Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten] |
| 15344 | Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten] |
| 15356 | Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten] |
| 15358 | Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten] |
| 15359 | Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten] |
| 15368 | This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten] |
| 18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
| 19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
| 19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
| 16338 | Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach] |
| 16317 | The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach] |
| 16316 | Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach] |
| 16319 | Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach] |
| 16320 | Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach] |
| 15656 | Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach] |
| 19075 | Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO] |