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3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth

[truth has no nature, and refers to nothing]

32 ideas
True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)]
Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski]
We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer]
'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn]
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock]
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen]
Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel]
Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel]
Deflationism just says there is no property of being truth [Merricks]
Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni]
Inferential deflationism says truth has no essence because no unrestricted logic governs the concept [Horsten]
Deflationism skips definitions and models, and offers just accounts of basic laws of truth [Horsten]
Deflationism concerns the nature and role of truth, but not its laws [Horsten]
Deflationism says truth isn't a topic on its own - it just concerns what is true [Horsten]
Deflation: instead of asserting a sentence, we can treat it as an object with the truth-property [Horsten]
This deflationary account says truth has a role in generality, and in inference [Horsten]
Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak]
Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak]
Deflationism says truth is a disquotation device to express generalisations, adding no new knowledge [Halbach]
The main problem for deflationists is they can express generalisations, but not prove them [Halbach]
Deflationists say truth is just for expressing infinite conjunctions or generalisations [Halbach]
Some say deflationism is axioms which are conservative over the base theory [Halbach]
Compositional Truth CT proves generalisations, so is preferred in discussions of deflationism [Halbach]
Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
Deflationary theories reject analysis of truth in terms of truth-conditions [Young,JO]