19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
19434 | There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz] |
15883 | Leibniz narrows down God's options to one, by non-contradiction, sufficient reason, indiscernibles, compossibility [Leibniz, by Harré] |
18822 | Each monad expresses all its compatible monads; a possible world is the resulting equivalence class [Leibniz, by Rumfitt] |
7837 | Leibniz proposed possible worlds, because they might be evil, where God would not create evil things [Leibniz, by Stewart,M] |
14460 | If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell] |
5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
23470 | Each thing is in a space of possible facts [Wittgenstein] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
16957 | Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett] |
14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga] |
4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
9669 | There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis] |
7691 | The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette] |
10266 | Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro] |
4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
10983 | Knowledge of possible worlds is not causal, but is an ontology entailed by semantics [Read] |
7792 | A world has 'access' to a world it generates, which is important in possible worlds semantics [Girle] |
5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |