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20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes

[reasons have a distinct causal role in actions]

22 ideas
Our reasoned acts are held to be voluntary and our own doing [Aristotle]
We assign the cause of someone's walking when we say why they are doing it [Aristotle]
Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer]
I want to suppress in myself the normal reasons people have for action [Cioran]
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
Explaining an action is showing that it is rational [Newton-Smith]
Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe]
Rational decisions are either taken to be based on evidence, or to be explained causally [Conee/Feldman]
Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R]
A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R]
In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R]
It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall]
Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall]
Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]