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17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism

[mind is a non-reducible physical property]

17 ideas
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane]
H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers]
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil]
Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin]