5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
2587 | Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam] |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
3376 | We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim] |
3424 | Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim] |
2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
2985 | Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor] |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
2406 | H2O causes liquidity, but no one is a dualist about that [Chalmers] |
4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |