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17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability

[lots of way to implement a thought]

24 ideas
Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong]
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle]
If different states can fulfil the same role, the converse must also be possible [Jackson]
Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry]
A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG]
The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett]
Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block]
Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor]
Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau]
If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R]
Multiple realisability rules out hidden essences and experts as the source of water- and gold-concepts [McGinn]
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
Temperature (etc.) is agreed to be reducible, but it is multiply realisable [Chalmers]
Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil]
'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil]
Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil]
Consciousness is a process, not a thing, as it maintains unity as its composition changes [Edelman/Tononi]
Maybe a mollusc's brain events for pain ARE of the same type (broadly) as a human's [PG]
Maybe a frog's brain events for fear are functionally like ours, but not phenomenally [PG]