| 5252 | 'Enkrateia' (control) means abiding by one's own calculations [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The continent man (controlled, 'enkratic') is identical with one who tends to abide by his own calculation. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1145b09) | |
| A reaction: The point is that this is NOT virtue, even though it results in doing the right thing. In such an 'enkratic' (controlled) person the reason is in a healthy state, but the desires, emotions and pleasures are badly trained. |
| 3549 | Ariston says rules are useless for the virtuous and the non-virtuous [Ariston, by Annas] |
| Full Idea: Ariston says that rules are useless if you are virtuous, and useless if you are not. | |
| From: report of Ariston (fragments/reports [c.250 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness 2.4 |
| 19407 | We want good education and sociability, rather than lots of moral precepts [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The true practical philosophy consists in good rules for education, intercourse and sociability among men, rather than in general precepts on virtues and duties. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Bouvet [1697], p.165) | |
| A reaction: I would interpret that as saying that the main aim of morality is to enable people to hold a good conversation. I've heard worse theories of morality. The remark shows why Leibniz has little to say explicitly about morality. |
| 6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
| Full Idea: What rule of actions can be formed, without relation to some end proposed? Or what end can be proposed, without presupposing instincts, desires, affections, or a moral sense, it will not be easy to explain. | |
| From: Francis Hutcheson (Treatise 4: The Moral Sense [1728], §IV) | |
| A reaction: We have no reason to think that 'instincts, desires and affections' will give us the remotest guidance on how to behave morally well (though we would expect them to aid our survival). How could a moral sense give a reason, without spotting a rule? |
| 7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
| Full Idea: It has been argued that by 'maxim' Kant does not mean a specific intention for some discrete act, but the underlying intention by which the agent orchestrates his numerous more specific intentions, ...which leads to a virtue reading of Kant. | |
| From: report of Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Daniel Statman - Introduction to Virtue Ethics §7 | |
| A reaction: Kant admired virtue of character, and would want to fit it into the framework of his moral duties. Nevertheless a virtue would often seem to be beyond words, and principles seem to crumble in the face of complex cases. |
| 4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
| Full Idea: Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality essentially in terms of each other. | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §20.2 | |
| A reaction: An interesting comment on the modern tendency to overvalue freedom at the expense of the other civic virtues. |
| 7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
| Full Idea: We can reverse the terms of the comparison and ask not how rational is goodness, but why is it good to be rational? | |
| From: comment on Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785]) by Hilary Putnam - Reason, Truth and History | |
| A reaction: [Putnam doesn't mention Kant]. This seems to me to be the biggest question for Kant. See Idea 1403. The main point of tbe romantic movement, I take it, is that purely rational living does not bring happiness or fulfilment. |
| 3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
| Full Idea: It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 393.1) | |
| A reaction: This is precisely the thought of Epictetus, that the will is the source of goodness, because morality resides in choices (as opposed to character, or states of affairs). |
| 3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
| Full Idea: Agreeable results could be brought about by other causes;…therefore nothing but the idea of the law in itself, which is present only in a rational being, can constitute that pre-eminent good which we call moral. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 401.15) |
| 3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The will is absolutely good if it cannot be evil - that is, if its maxim, when made into a universal law, can never be in conflict with itself. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], 437.81) |
| 20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
| Full Idea: The first proposition of morality is that to have moral worth an action must be done from duty. | |
| From: Immanuel Kant (Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals [1785], p.19), quoted by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 9 'Religion' | |
| A reaction: [p.19 in Beck tr] In Aristotle's account these are 'controlled' actions [enkrateia], which are a step below virtuous actions, which combine reason and pleasure. |
| 2915 | Each person should devise his own virtues and categorical imperative [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Each one of us should devise his own virtue, his own categorical imperative. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (The Anti-Christ [1889], 11) |
| 7185 | Replace the categorical imperative by the natural imperative [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Replacement of the categorical imperative by the natural imperative. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Writings from Late Notebooks [1887], 09[27]) | |
| A reaction: This places Nietzsche rather firmly with evolutionary psychologists (who see morality in evolutionary terms), which he probably would not like. I just don't believe we are helpless victims of nature, and nor must we endorse what it asks of us. |
| 8065 | 'Ought' and 'right' are survivals from earlier ethics, and should be jettisoned [Anscombe] |
| Full Idea: The moral sense of 'ought' and of what is right should be jettisoned, if possible, because they are survivals from an earlier conception of ethics, and are only harmful without it. | |
| From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Modern Moral Philosophy [1958], p.175) | |
| A reaction: This is part of a revolutionary proposal to return to virtue theory, and has had a great influence (e.g. on me). Richard Taylor gives a good account of how duty lost its social and religious underpinnings. Our duties now seem to be purely contractual. |
| 8069 | Between Aristotle and us, a Judaeo-Christian legal conception of ethics was developed [Anscombe] |
| Full Idea: Between Aristotle and us came Christianity, with its law conception of ethics, and Christianity derived its ethical notions from the Torah. | |
| From: G.E.M. Anscombe (Modern Moral Philosophy [1958], p.179) | |
| A reaction: While I am a fan of the primacy of the virtues in ethical thinking, I am doubtful about the complete elimination of laws (e.g. by Particularists). The law teaches us the virtues, and reminds us of them (like speed-limit signs). |
| 22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
| Full Idea: 'One ought to be moral' makes no sense at all unless the 'ought' has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette. | |
| From: Philippa Foot (Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives [1972], p.169 n18) | |
| A reaction: This aims to undercut the Kantian view that morality is an absolute call to duty (filling us with wonder, like the starry heavens). Foot aims to root morality in the real world. |
| 5077 | The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R] |
| Full Idea: In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself. | |
| From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12) | |
| A reaction: This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings). |
| 4113 | 'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B] |
| Full Idea: There is no ancient Greek word for duty; the word 'deon' (the basis of 'deontology') means what one must do. | |
| From: Bernard Williams (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [1985], Ch. 1) | |
| A reaction: Presumably it covered compulsions which were not duties, such as the need to eat or drink. Greeks thought morally, but lacked a good moral vocabulary? |
| 3261 | Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel] |
| Full Idea: "Rational" may mean rationally required or rationally acceptable | |
| From: Thomas Nagel (The View from Nowhere [1986], X.4) |
| 20276 | Conflict of rules might be avoided by greater complexity, or by a hierarchy of rules [Singer] |
| Full Idea: Those who think ethics is a system of rules can rescue their position by finding more complicated and more specific rules which do not conflict, or by ranking the rules in some hierarchical structure to resolve conflicts. | |
| From: Peter Singer (Practical Ethics [1979], 01) | |
| A reaction: The problem is that clear-cut rules seem to produce conflicts. I would have thought that more specific rules would increase that problem. Safety is in generality. |
| 3784 | Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover] |
| Full Idea: The deontological view is that some acts are absolutely prohibited, regardless of consequences. | |
| From: Jonathan Glover (Introductions to Utilitarianism and its Critics [1990], Pt Five) |
| 3550 | Principles cover life as a whole, where rules just cover actions [Annas] |
| Full Idea: Principles concern not just types of actions, but one's life as a whole, grasping truths about the nature of justice, and the like; they explain rules, giving the 'why' and not just the 'what'. | |
| From: Julia Annas (The Morality of Happiness [1993], 2.4) |
| 4327 | Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: Though it is sometimes said that deontologists 'take no account of consequences', this is manifestly false, for many actions we deliberate about only fall under rules or principles when we bring in their predicted consequences. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.1) | |
| A reaction: An important defence of deontology, which otherwise is vulnerable to the 'well-meaning fool' problem. It is no good having a good will, but refusing to think about consequences. |
| 4335 | 'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse] |
| Full Idea: If morality is strongly 'codifiable', it should consist of rules which provide a decision procedure, and it should be equally applicable by the virtuous and the non-virtuous, without recourse to wisdom. | |
| From: Rosalind Hursthouse (On Virtue Ethics [1999], Ch.2) | |
| A reaction: A key idea. Religions want obedience, and Kant wants morality to be impersonal, and most people want morality which simple uneducated people can follow. And yet how can wisdom ever be irrelevant? |