4862 | Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
Full Idea: I am in ignorance whether the pineal gland can be agitated more slowly or more quickly by the mind than by the animal spirits. | |
From: comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.82) by Baruch de Spinoza - The Ethics V Pref | |
A reaction: Is this the earliest statement of the problem of double causation? It is a classic difficulty for dualists, highlighted by Ryle, among others. Avoidance of double causation is a classic reason for moving to monism about mind. |
5606 | Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant] |
Full Idea: Are freedom and natural necessity contradictory in an action? We have shown that freedom can relate to conditions of a kind entirely different from those in natural necessity, so each is independent of the other. | |
From: Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [1781], B585/A557) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure I understand this, but I suspect that it means that a serious case of kleptomania while never provide even the hint of an excuse for a minor theft. We're all free, and that's that. I am dubious. |
2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
Full Idea: The dogma of the Ghost in the Machine maintains that there exist both minds and bodies; that there are mechanical causes of corporeal movements, and mental causes of corporeal movements. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (The Concept of Mind [1949], I (3)) | |
A reaction: This nicely identifies the problem of double causation, which can be found in Spinoza (Idea 4862). The dualists have certainly got a problem here, but they can deny a conflict. The initiation of a hand movement is not mechanical at all. |
2318 | Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG] |
Full Idea: The following all require a belief in mental causation: agency (mind causes events), knowledge (perception causes beliefs), reasoning (one belief causes another), memory (events cause ideas), psychology (science of mental causes). | |
From: report of Jaegwon Kim (Mind in a Physical World [1998], §2 p.031) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: A very good list, which I cannot fault, and to which I cannot add. The question is: is there any mental activity left over which does NOT require causation? Candidates are free will, and the contingent character of qualia. I say the answer is, no. |
3392 | Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim] |
Full Idea: Unless mental properties have causal powers, there would be little point in worrying about them. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.118) | |
A reaction: This doesn't, on its own, actually rule out epiphenomenalism, but it does show why it barely qualifies as a serious theory. One might, in fact, say that we simply can't worry about something which has no causal powers. The powers might not be physical… |
3396 | Experiment requires mental causation [Kim] |
Full Idea: Experimentation presupposes mental-to-physical causation and is impossible without it. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.128) | |
A reaction: So an epiphenomenalist can't do experiments? Kim implies that there is some special mental assessment of the feedback from physical events, but presumably a robot or a zombie could do experiments. Spiders do experiments. |
3397 | Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim] |
Full Idea: A brief reflection makes it evident that most of our beliefs are generated by other beliefs we hold, and "generation" here could only mean causal generation. | |
From: Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.128) | |
A reaction: This seems right, and yet implies an uncomfortable determinism, as if all our beliefs just happened to us. I don't claim proper free will, but I do say there is an element in belief formation which is just caused by bunches of beliefs. Call it character. |
4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
Full Idea: We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur. | |
From: John Perry (Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness [2001], §2.4) | |
A reaction: A small and obvious, but important, point. Mental causation isn't just thoughts leading to physical happenings. Here Perry means that events can be designed to cause thoughts, such as a threatening letter. Not much room for epiphenomenalism here. |
7864 | Maybe mind and body do overdetermine acts, but are linked (for some reason) [Papineau] |
Full Idea: Maybe physical effects of mental causes are always overdetermined by distinct causes (the 'belt and braces' view). Defenders say the two are still counterfactually dependent - but that would raise the question of why, if they are ontologically distinct. | |
From: David Papineau (Thinking about Consciousness [2002], 1.5) | |
A reaction: [He cites D.H. Mellor as defending 'belt and braces'] This strikes me as the sort of theory that arises from desperation: traditional dualism won't work, but we MUST keep mind separate, so that we can have free will, and save morality. All very confused! |
6120 | Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane] |
Full Idea: The problem thoughts pose for causation is that causation depends directly only on intrinsic properties, whereas the causal powers of token thoughts depend on their contents, which are not intrinsic. | |
From: DH Mellor / T Crane (There is no question of physicalism [1990], p.194) | |
A reaction: This, as we find later in the paper, depends on an externalist account of thoughts. Could a relational property not be causal? Edinburgh's being wetter than London is caused by its being further north? |
5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
Full Idea: In the seventeenth century the dominant idea that causation is collisionlike made mental causation almost impossible to envision. | |
From: Owen Flanagan (The Problem of the Soul [2002], p.136) | |
A reaction: Interesting. This makes Descartes' interaction theory look rather bold, and Leibniz's and Malebranche's rejection of it understandable. Personally I still think of causation as collisionlike, except that the collisions are of very very tiny objects. |
4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
Full Idea: If a mental property is realised by a material property, then it looks as though its material realiser pre-empts any causal contribution on the part of the realised mental property. | |
From: John Heil (Philosophy of Mind [1998], Ch.6) | |
A reaction: This has a beautiful simplicity about it. I can see how some very odd phenomena might suddenly appear out of a physical combination, but not how entirely new causal laws can be created. |