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17549
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Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life
[Heisenberg, by PG]
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Full Idea:
Science has seven closed systems of concepts and axioms: Newtonian mechanics; the theory of heat; electricity and magnetism; quantum theory; the theory of elementary particles; general relativity; and the theory of organic life.
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From:
report of Werner Heisenberg (Physics and Philosophy [1958], 06) by PG - Db (ideas)
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A reaction:
[my summary of pp.86-88 and 92] It is interesting to have spelled out that there are number of 'closed' theories, which are only loosely connected to one another. New discoveries launch whole new theories, instead of being subsumed.
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8365
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Some laws are causal (Ohm's Law), but others are conceptual principles (conservation of energy)
[Wright,GHv]
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Full Idea:
Not all laws are causal 'experimentalist' laws, such as those for falling bodies, or the Gas Law, or Ohm's Law. Some are more like conceptual principles, giving a frame of reference, such as inertia, or conservation of energy, or the law of entropy.
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From:
G.H. von Wright (Logic and Epistemology of Causal Relations [1973], §9)
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A reaction:
An interesting and important distinction, whenever one is exploring the links between theories of causation and of laws of nature. If one wished to attack the whole concept of 'laws of nature', this might be a good place to start.
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6616
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Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence
[Ellis]
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Full Idea:
The principle of least action is not a causal law, but is what I call a 'global law', which describes the essence of the global kind, which every object in the universe necessarily instantiates.
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From:
Brian Ellis (Katzav on limitations of dispositions [2005])
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A reaction:
As a fan of essentialism I find this persuasive. If I inherit part of my essence from being a mammal, I inherit other parts of my essence from being an object, and all objects would share that essence, so it would look like a 'law' for all objects.
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15862
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Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures
[Harré]
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Full Idea:
Boyle's Law generalises a mass of messy data culled from an apparatus; Snell's Law is an experimentally derived law deducible from theory; Newton's First Law derives from concepts and thought experiments; Mendel's Law used an experimental procedure.
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From:
Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 1)
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A reaction:
Nice examples, especially since Boyle's and Newton's laws are divided by a huge gulf, and arrived at about the same time. On p.35 Harré says these come down to two: abstraction from experiment, and derivation from deep assumptions.
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15870
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Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three?
[Harré]
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Full Idea:
What is Newton's First Law about? Is it about events? Is it about types or universals? Is it about dispositions? Or is it, in some peculiar way, about all three?
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From:
Rom Harré (Laws of Nature [1993], 2)
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A reaction:
If laws merely chart regularities, then I suppose they are about events (which exhibit the regular patterns). If laws explain, which would be nice, then they are only about universals if you are a platonist. Hence laws are about dispositions.
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6781
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There are fundamental explanatory laws (false!), and phenomenological laws (regularities)
[Cartwright,N, by Bird]
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Full Idea:
Nancy Cartwright distinguishes between 'fundamental explanatory laws', which we should not believe, and 'phenomenological laws', which are regularities established on the basis of observation.
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From:
report of Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie [1983]) by Alexander Bird - Philosophy of Science Ch.4
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A reaction:
The distinction is helpful, so that we can be clearer about what everyone is claiming. We can probably all agree on the phenomenological laws, which are epistemological. Personally I claim truth for the best fundamental explanatory laws.
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