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4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 1. Nonclassical Logics

[general ideas about logics which depart from standard logic]

2 ideas
Nonclassical may accept T/F but deny applicability, or it may deny just T or F as well [Horsten]
     Full Idea: Some nonclassical logic stays close to classical, assuming two mutually exclusive truth values T and F, but some sentences fail to have one. Others have further truth values such as 'half truth', or dialethists allow some T and F at the same time.
     From: Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.2)
     A reaction: I take that to say that the first lot accept bivalence but reject excluded middle (allowing 'truth value gaps'), while the second lot reject both. Bivalence gives the values available, and excluded middle says what has them.
We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli]
     Full Idea: The exceptional status of an object with respect to some default is more likely to spread to other objects if they share properties with that object that may play a role in explaining the exceptional status.
     From: G. Aldo Antonelli (Non-Monotonic Logic [2014], 4)
     A reaction: This is an example of the sort of rational behaviour we exhibit, and which a 'real life' logic would somehow need to capture. I would suggest the essentialist logic designed by Kit Fine as a first port of call.