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19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics

[giving full meaning by specifying some set of possible worlds]

17 ideas
The intension of a sentence is the set of all possible worlds in which it is true [Carnap, by Kaplan]
Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker]
Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker]
Thought content is possible worlds that make the thought true; if that includes the actual world, it's true [Papineau]
Truth conditions in possible worlds can't handle statements about impossibilities [Papineau]
A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan]
Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan]
If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K]
Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares]
We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall]
Possible worlds semantics uses 'intensions' - functions which assign extensions at each world [Schroeter]
Possible worlds make 'I' and that person's name synonymous, but they have different meanings [Schroeter]
Possible worlds semantics implies a constitutive connection between meanings and modal claims [Schroeter]
In the possible worlds account all necessary truths are same (because they all map to the True) [Schroeter]
Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]