structure for 'Objects'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     expand these ideas

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

[the idea of summed parts as a single entity]

45 ideas
It seems that the One must be composed of parts, which contradicts its being one [Plato]
The whole can't be the parts, because it would be all of the parts, which is the whole [Plato]
A sum is that from which nothing is lacking, which is a whole [Plato]
Plato says wholes are either containers, or they're atomic, or they don't exist [Plato, by Koslicki]
Wholes are continuous, rigid, uniform, similar, same kind, similar matter [Aristotle, by Simons]
A syllable is something different from its component vowels and consonants [Aristotle]
We first sense whole entities, and then move to particular parts of it [Aristotle]
There is no whole except for the parts [Aristotle]
The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle]
In the case of a house the parts can exist without the whole, so parts are not the whole [Aristotle]
How is separateness possible, if separated things are always said to be united? [Alexander on Stoic school]
How is divisibility possible, if stoics say things remain united when they are divided? [Alexander on Stoic school]
Stoics say wholes are more than parts, but entirely consist of parts [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus]
Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts [Sext.Empiricus]
What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes]
A whole must have one characteristic, an internal relation, and a structure [Rescher/Oppenheim]
Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB]
If I destroy an item, I do not destroy each part of it [Wiggins]
I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis]
Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis]
There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider]
Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K]
Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis]
A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis]
Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis]
Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen]
Two sorts of whole have 'rigid embodiment' (timeless parts) or 'variable embodiment' (temporary parts) [Fine,K]
Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil]
Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil]
It is argued that wholes possess modal and counterfactual properties that parts lack [Rowlands]
Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons]
There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J]
The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J]
At what point does an object become 'whole'? [Westaway]
A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross]
Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack]
The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack]
If an object survives the loss of a part, complex objects can have autonomy over their parts [Robb]
Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki]
Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki]
Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki]
That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]