| 7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
| 14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
| 15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
| 7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
| 7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
| 10981 | A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read] |
| 19011 | If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter] |