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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions

[possible worlds as maximal sets of propositions]

7 ideas
If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis]
You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N]
If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette]
We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette]
A possible world is a determination of the truth-values of all propositions of a domain [Read]
If worlds are sets of propositions, how do we know which propositions are genuinely possible? [Vetter]