17208 | A horse would be destroyed if it were changed into a man or an insect [Spinoza] |
12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
11027 | To know an object you must know all its possible occurrences [Wittgenstein] |
23465 | The 'form' of an object is its possible roles in facts [Wittgenstein] |
12443 | Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
11965 | Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa? [Chisholm] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
16993 | If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke] |
16998 | Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke] |
17001 | A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke] |
4952 | Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke] |
11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
13725 | □ must be sensitive as to whether it picks out an object by essential or by contingent properties [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13731 | Objects retain their possible properties across worlds, so a bundle theory of them seems best [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
15377 | Definite descriptions pick out different objects in different possible worlds [Fitting] |
13081 | Even extreme modal realists might allow transworld identity for abstract objects [Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne] |
12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg] |
13717 | Transworld identity is not a problem in de dicto sentences, which needn't identify an individual [Sider] |
15176 | The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle] |
12889 | The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons] |
11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |