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10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism

[proposal that only our actual world exists]

13 ideas
The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce]
The best version of reductionist actualism around is Armstrong's combinatorial account [Armstrong, by Read]
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong]
Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds rest on the objects about which we have suppositions [Wiggins]
The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker]
Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis]
Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis]
What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis]
Actualism is reductionist (to parts of actuality), or moderate realist (accepting real abstractions) [Read]
Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen]