structure for 'Theory of Logic'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     unexpand these ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / b. The Heap paradox ('Sorites')

[problem with defining what makes a heap]

6 ideas
Zeno is wrong that one grain of millet makes a sound; why should one grain achieve what the whole bushel does? [Aristotle on Zeno of Elea]
     Full Idea: Zeno is wrong in arguing that the tiniest fragment of millet makes a sound; there is no reason why the fragment should be able to move in any amount of time the air which the whole bushel moved as it fell.
     From: comment on Zeno (Elea) (fragments/reports [c.450 BCE], A29) by Aristotle - Physics 250a16
Removing one grain doesn't destroy a heap, so a heap can't be destroyed [Eubulides, by Dancy,R]
     Full Idea: The 'sorites' paradox of Eubulides says: if you take one grain of sand from a heap (soros), what is left is still a heap; so no matter how many grains of sand you take one by one, the result is always a heap.
     From: report of Eubulides (fragments/reports [c.390 BCE]) by R.M. Dancy - Megarian School
     A reaction: (also Cic. Acad. 2.49) This is a very nice paradox, which goes to the heart of our bewilderment when we try to fully understand reality. It homes in on problems of identity, as best exemplified in the Ship of Theseus (Ideas 1212 + 1213).
Surely there is no exact single grain that brings a heap into existence [Dummett]
     Full Idea: There is surely no number n such that "n grains of sand do not make a heap, although n+1 grains of sand do" is true.
     From: Michael Dummett (Truth and the Past [2001], 4)
     A reaction: It might be argued that there is such a number, but no human being is capable of determing it. Might God know the value of n? On the whole Dummett's view seems the most plausible.
There are no heaps [Inwagen]
     Full Idea: Fortunately ....there are no heaps.
     From: Peter van Inwagen (Material Beings [1990], 18)
     A reaction: This is the nihilist view of (inorganic) physical objects. If a wild view solves all sorts of problems, one should take it serious. It is why I take reductive physicalism about the mind seriously. (Well, it's true, actually)
The smallest heap has four objects: three on the bottom, one on the top [Hart,WD, by Sorensen]
     Full Idea: Hart argues that the smallest heap consists of four objects: three on the bottom, one on the top.
     From: report of William D. Hart (Hat-Tricks and Heaps [1992]) by Roy Sorensen - Vagueness and Contradiction Intro
     A reaction: If the objects were rough bolders, you could get away with two on the bottom. He's wrong. No one would accept as a 'heap' four minute grains barely visible to the naked eye. No one would describe such a group of items in a supermarket as a heap.
A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson]
     Full Idea: A sorites paradox is stopped when it collides with a sorites paradox going in the opposite direction. That account will not strike a logician as solving the sorites paradox.
     From: Timothy Williamson (Vagueness [1994], 3.3)