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22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure

[what types of pleasure are there?]

16 ideas
A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato]
     Full Idea: A tiny little pleasure is, if uncontaminated by pain, always more pleasant, truer and finer than a large amount.
     From: Plato (Philebus [c.353 BCE], 53b)
     A reaction: More Platonic puritanism. Is a complete absence of pleasure the highest pleasure of all? I don't think I understand 'truer'. Why would a pleasure be false because it is intense?
Nice smells are intensive, have no preceding pain, and no bad after-effect [Plato]
     Full Idea: Nice smells have no preceding feeling of pain, they are very intense, and they leave no distress when they are over.
     From: Plato (The Republic [c.374 BCE], 584b)
     A reaction: A nice example for extreme puritans to contemplate. Objections to enjoying nice smells seem almost inconceivable. Puritans will, I suppose, say 'slippery slope'.
There are pleasures of the soul (e.g. civic honour, and learning) and of the body [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: We must distinguish pleasures of the soul from pleasures of the body; examples of the former are love of civic distinction and love of learning.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1117b28)
     A reaction: An example of where enthusiasm for analysis leads to oversimplification, and of how dualism about mind can colour the rest of one's views. There is a physical pleasure in learning something, and some physical pleasures are almost spiritual.
God feels one simple pleasure forever [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: God feels one simple pleasure forever.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1154b25)
     A reaction: Compare Idea 382.
Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Intellectual pleasures are superior to sensuous ones.
     From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1176a02)
     A reaction: This claim, for which he here offers no support, depends on the idea that pleasure can have a value, as well as an intensity. Mill agreed with him, but Bentham disagreed (Idea 5271)
The end for Epicurus is static pleasure [Epicurus, by Annas]
     Full Idea: Epicurus identifies our final end with what he calls tranquillity or 'ataraxia', which is static pleasure.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Julia Annas - The Morality of Happiness Ch.7
Pains of the soul are worse than pains of the body, because it feels the past and future [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: The pains of the soul are worst, for the flesh is only sensible of present affliction, but the soul feels the past, present and future.
     From: report of Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.29
     A reaction: I don't think feeling extended across time is very relevant. What matters is that pains of the soul usually endure far longer than physical suffering.
Pleasures only differ in their duration and the part of the body affected [Epicurus]
     Full Idea: If every pleasure lasted long, and affected the whole body, then there would be no difference between one pleasure and another
     From: Epicurus (fragments/reports [c.289 BCE]), quoted by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 10.31.08
     A reaction: This seems to miss out on intensity, which is of great importance to most pleasure seekers. Also it is a pleasure to be alive, which is lifelong, but we barely notice it.
Good and true are the same for everyone, but pleasures differ [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: For all men, good and true are the same; but pleasant differs for different men.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B069)
     A reaction: Truth is not 'for' anyone, but there's good-in-itself, and good-for-me. Are there some pleasures we should all enjoy (such as watching our children flourish)?
We should only choose pleasures which are concerned with the beautiful [Democritus (attr)]
     Full Idea: One should choose not every pleasure, but only that concerned with the beautiful.
     From: Democritus (attrib) (reports [c.250 BCE], B207), quoted by John Stobaeus - Anthology 3.05.22
     A reaction: The pleasures we should prefer are those which involve the whole person, rather than the mere stimulation of one sense. Sez me.
Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Cyrenaics place pleasure wholly in motion, whereas Epicurus admits it as a condition.
     From: Diogenes Laertius (Lives of Eminent Philosophers [c.250], 10.28)
     A reaction: Not a distinction we meet in modern discussions. Do events within the mind count as 'motion'? If so, these two agree. If not, I'd vote for Epicurus.
Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham]
     Full Idea: Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and science of music and poetry.
     From: Jeremy Bentham (Constitutional Code I [1827], p.139), quoted by J.R. Dinwiddy - Bentham p.114
     A reaction: Mill quoted this with implied outrage, but Bentham was attacking public subsidies to the arts when he said it. It is a basic idea in the debate on pleasure - that pleasures are only distinguished by their intensity, not some other value.
Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham]
     Full Idea: Most of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure refer to further pleasures, or are irrelevant to the pleasure; we are left with intensity and duration as the characteristics on which depend the value of a pleasure qua pleasure, and there is nothing to add.
     From: comment on Jeremy Bentham (Intro to Principles of Morals and Legislation [1789]) by W. David Ross - The Right and the Good §VI
     A reaction: I agree. When Bentham produces his list he seems to be trying to add a bogus enrichment to what is really a rather crude and basic notion of the aim of life. Your simple hedonist appears to only desire high intensity and long duration.
He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert]
     Full Idea: He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul.
     From: Joseph Joubert (Notebooks [1800], 1799)
     A reaction: A rather crucial distinction in the world of hedonism. There seems something sincere about someone who pursues pleasure body and soul, and something fractured about the pursuit of pleasure without real commitment. The split seems possible.
The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot]
     Full Idea: For epicureans, the only genuine pleasure there is is the pleasure of existing.
     From: Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a way of life [1987], 3.1)
     A reaction: I don't know Hadot's source for this claim, but it is a nice idea, which I shall endeavour to incorporate into my own attitude to daily living. I'm not quite clear, though, why the pleasure of music is not a 'genuine' one.
Greeks and early Christians were much more concerned about food than about sex [Foucault]
     Full Idea: It is interesting to see the very slow move from the privileging of food, which was overwhelming in Greece, to interest in sex. Early Christians (and rules for monks) were more concerned with food. Sex only dominates from the seventeenth century.
     From: Michel Foucault (On the Genealogy of Ethics [1983], p.253)
     A reaction: Certainly the Greeks were obsessed with food, and the Sicilian Greeks were notorious for their love of it. Is it simply that food becomes more plentiful, or does female freedom lead to more sex? Puritanism hates the greatest pleasures the most.