| 2050 | It is impossible to believe something which is held to be false [Plato] |
| 4391 | Opinion is praised for being in accordance with truth [Aristotle] |
| 1685 | No one has mere belief about something if they think it HAS to be true [Aristotle] |
| 14050 | We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus] |
| 9100 | Our intellect only assents to what we believe to be true [William of Ockham] |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| 14781 | A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce] |
| 19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
| 4485 | Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche] |
| 6672 | Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe] |
| 3212 | Beliefs are maps by which we steer [Ramsey] |
| 6600 | The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein] |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
| 3570 | Maybe knowledge is belief which 'tracks' the truth [Nozick, by Williams,M] |
| 6783 | To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird] |
| 4760 | Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson] |
| 4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
| 19525 | If the only aim is to believe truths, that justifies recklessly believing what is unsupported (if it is right) [Conee/Feldman] |
| 15372 | Some claim that indicative conditionals are believed by people, even though they are not actually held true [Horsten] |