Single Idea 8799

[catalogued under 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique]

Full Idea

If a mental state is not propositional, then how can it possibly serve as a foundation for belief? How can one infer or justify anything on the basis of a state that, having no propositional content, must be logically dumb?

Gist of Idea

If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations

Source

Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §11)

Book Reference

'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.148


A Reaction

This may be the best objection to foundationalism. McDowell tries to argue that conceptual content is inherent in perception, thus giving the beginnings of inbuilt propositional content. But an organism awash with bare experiences knows nothing.