Single Idea 19084

[catalogued under 3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth]

Full Idea

It must be remembered that coherentists do not believe that the truth of a proposition consists in coherence with an arbitrarily chosen set of propositions; the coherence is with a set of beliefs, or a set of propositions held to be true.

Gist of Idea

Coherent truth is not with an arbitrary set of beliefs, but with a set which people actually do believe

Source

James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §3.1)

Book Reference

'Stanford Online Encyclopaedia of Philosophy', ed/tr. Stanford University [plato.stanford.edu], p.4


A Reaction

This is a very good response to critics who cite bizarre sets of beliefs which happen to have internal coherence. You have to ask why they are not actually believed, and the answer must be that the coherence is not extensive enough.