Combining Texts

All the ideas for '', 'Epistemology Naturalized' and 'The Nature of Mental States'

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20 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
11211 If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
11210 Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt]
11212 The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
1635 Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
7627 You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine]
8871 We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson]
8826 If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine]
8827 Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine]
8899 Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2590 Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2591 Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2588 Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
2589 Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
2592 Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
2587 Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
6376 Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
2330 If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
8898 Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
8900 In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
11214 We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt]